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THE TROUBLEMAKER’S FRIEND: RETALIATION AGAINST
THIRD PARTIES AND THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION IN THE
WORKPLACE
Alex B. Long*
“To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family is an ancient
method of revenge, and is not unknown in the field of labor relations.”
NLRB v. Advertisers Manufacturing Co.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals who complain about workplace discrimination are
frequently labeled as troublemakers by those in positions of authority
within the organization.2 As troublemakers, such individuals potentially
face various forms of retaliation. Eugene Mestas was one such
troublemaker.3 After leaving his employment, Mestas hired an attorney,
who sent a letter to Mestas’s former employer, informing the employer of
Mestas’s intent to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).4 The employer was
somewhat limited in its ability to retaliate against Mestas, a former
employee. However, Mestas’s fiancé, Revonda Mickle, remained an
employee.5 Mickle was on maternity leave after having given birth to
Mestas’s child when Mestas’s attorney contacted the employer about
Mestas’s impending EEOC charge.6 When Mickle inquired about ending
her leave early and returning to work, she was informed that her services
were no longer needed.7
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who opposes
an employer’s discriminatory conduct or who testifies, assists, or
participates in any manner in an investigation related to a charge of
discrimination.8 Despite the protection afforded by Title VII, situations
such as Mickle’s, in which an employer targets a friend, relative, or other
associate in order to retaliate against a workplace troublemaker, are
surprisingly common in federal decisions.9 These are cases of “pure” third2. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 32 (2005).
3. EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 324–25.
6. Id. at 324.
7. Id. at 324–25.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
9. See generally Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts,
63 MO. L. REV. 115, 130 (1998) (“Aside from the issue of how much retaliation an employer may
permissibly carry out against an employee before it counts as an ‘adverse employment action,’ there
is no more uncertain area of the case law on retaliation than that of retaliation against employees
who work in the same workplace as spouses, relatives, or other closely related third parties who
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party retaliation, in which a coworker—who has committed no offense
other than having a relationship with the workplace troublemaker—is the
victim of the employer’s wrath. The courts have split on the question
whether § 704(a) of Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating
against a third party in retaliation for the protected activities of another
individual, with a clear majority concluding that no such cause of action
exists.10
As these cases of pure third-party retaliation make clear, it may be
dangerous to an individual’s employment prospects simply to associate
with a workplace troublemaker. However, it may be equally dangerous to
actually assist a troublemaker who files an internal complaint of
discrimination with the employer prior to filing a formal discrimination
charge with the EEOC. The federal courts have consistently held that
employees who participate in an employer’s internal investigation process
are entitled to significantly less protection from retaliation than employees

have themselves engaged in protected conduct.” (footnote omitted)).
10. The issue also comes up in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). For ease of reference, this Article discusses the issue in the
context of Title VII. However, the issues presented are essentially the same. For decisions holding
that employers are generally not prohibited from taking action against a third party, see Bell v.
Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, No. 03-3902, 107 F. App’x. 607, 609–10 (6th Cir. 2004);
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc.,
151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996);
Washco v. Fed. Express Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d 547, 556 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Singh v. Green Thumb
Landscaping, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Higgins v. TJX Co., 328 F. Supp.
2d 122, 124 (D. Me. 2004); Sukenic v. Maricopa County, No. Civ. 02-02438, 2004 WL 3522690,
at *12 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7, 2004); Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 327; Horizon Holdings,
LLC v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1143 (D. Kan. 2002); see also Ripp v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 210 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (holding that a white employee who
associated with black coworkers whom he believed were being discriminated against did not have
a claim under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions). For decisions reaching the opposite
conclusion, see Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 (N.D.N.Y.
2000); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Murphy v.
Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108, 1119 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); McKenzie v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 906 F. Supp. 572, 575 (D. Colo. 1995); Thurman v. Robertshaw Control Co., 869
F. Supp. 934, 941 (N.D. Ga. 1994); De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 581 (D.D.C. 1978).
See generally EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating in dicta that “a
plaintiff’s allegation of reprisal for a relative’s antidiscrimination activities states a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Title VII”); Genao v. N.Y. City Dept. of Parks & Recreation, No.
04 CV 2893 JG, 2005 WL 1220899 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2005) (involving a retaliation claim by the
brother of an employee who had filed a discrimination claim); Reiter v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No.
01 Civ. 2762(JGK), 2002 WL 31190167 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2002) (involving a retaliation claim
by the husband of an employee who had filed discrimination complaint). The issue also
occasionally comes up under state law. See Sweeney v. City of Ladue, 25 F.3d 702, 703 (8th Cir.
1994) (involving Missouri statutory law); Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d 505, 508
(N.J. 1995); Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 214 S.W. 3d 672, 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act does not permit such claims).
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who participate in formal EEOC proceedings or lawsuits.11 For the same
reason, it may be hazardous to an individual’s employment prospects for
the individual to seek to protect coworkers from discrimination by
complaining internally about a hostile work environment that affects other
employees, complaining about harassment directed at a coworker, or
participating in an employer’s internal investigation into such conduct.
Despite the fact that retaliation claims have reportedly doubled in the
last decade and now comprise 25% of all EEOC charges,12 Title VII’s antiretaliation provision has received far less attention in legal scholarship
than has the statute’s substantive anti-discrimination provision.13 What
criticism there has been of the courts’ treatment of § 704(a) has typically
focused on the limited protection that the majority interpretations have
afforded those who complain about workplace discrimination. The courts’
critics assert that this limited protection diminishes the ability of Title VII
to carry out its mission of combating workplace discrimination.14 This
Article eventually arrives at a similar discussion, but it reaches that point
through a somewhat different route. This Article focuses on the effect that
the majority interpretations of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision may
have on employees’ right of workplace association, and ultimately how
this effect impacts the ability of § 704(a) to combat discrimination. In
other words, the Article focuses not on the workplace troublemaker but on
the troublemaker’s friend.
In analyzing whether to permit retaliation claims based on an
individual’s association with or assistance to a coworker who has possibly
been the victim of workplace discrimination, the only policy value courts
typically discuss is the goal of maintaining access to the statute’s remedial
mechanisms.15 While courts occasionally raise questions about the
fundamental fairness of permitting an employer to take adverse action
against an associate of a workplace troublemaker,16 the primary focus is
usually on the effect that allowing such employer behavior will have on
Title VII’s enforcement mechanism.17 It is beyond question that
maintaining access to such mechanisms is the primary purpose of anti-

11. See, e.g., EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000);
Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998).
12. Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Are We There Yet? Forty Years After the
Passage of the Civil Rights Act: Revolution in the Workforce and the Unfulfilled Promises That
Remain, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 627, 658 (2005).
13. Brake, supra note 2, at 19.
14. See id. at 23.
15. See, e.g., Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d at 543.
16. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); Anita G. Schausten,
Comment, Retaliation Against Third Parties: A Potential Loophole in Title VII’s Discrimination
Protection, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2004).
17. See Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d at 543.
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retaliation provisions.18 However, this Article argues that there is another,
related value that is implicated in these cases and that routinely goes
unmentioned: the policy in favor of encouraging (or, at a bare minimum,
not discouraging) employees from associating with one another.
To be sure, no “right” of association is explicitly mentioned in Title
VII. But as this Article argues, the principle that an employer may not
interfere with the ability of its employees to associate with one another to
discuss workplace matters, provide mutual aid or protection, or other
similar purposes is deeply embedded in the fabric of federal employment
law.19 Moreover, this Article argues that there is an inherent value in
employee interaction and solidarity, particularly with regard to its potential
to combat workplace discrimination. Indeed, just as Title VII’s prohibition
on discrimination would be an empty shell without the protection afforded
by its anti-discrimination provision,20 § 704(a)’s protection from retaliation
would be an empty promise without the ability and willingness of
coworkers to assist and associate with whomever they choose, including
workplace troublemakers, without fear of employer reprisal.
Therefore, this Article analyzes these types of cases within the broader
context of employees’ rights to associate freely with one another. It argues
that in addition to the goal of permitting unfettered access to remedial
mechanisms, one of the goals of anti-retaliation provisions in employment
discrimination statutes should be not just to permit but to actually
encourage workers to meet and discuss management-employee relations
and to assist one another. Therefore, to the extent possible, courts should
interpret anti-retaliation provisions so as to encourage, or at least not
discourage, employees from associating with and assisting one another.
Part II examines the varying conceptions of the “right” of association in
the workplace, including in the public employment setting, the labor law
context, and in employment discrimination statutes. Part III discusses in
greater detail the anti-retaliation provisions found in employment
discrimination statutes and the tendency of courts to interpret the
provisions in a way that discourages employee interaction. Part IV
discusses the ways in which the majority interpretations of § 704(a) hinder
the fight against discrimination once such discrimination has occurred and
how encouraging greater employee interaction may help prevent the
creation of hostile work environments from developing in the first place.
Finally, Part V advances several arguments in favor of a broader
interpretation of § 704(a) that would encourage greater employee
interaction, including an approach that utilizes the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.21
18.
19.
20.
21.

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
See infra Part II.B.
See Brake, supra note 2, at 20.
126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
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II. THE RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATION IN FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. The First Amendment Right of Association and the Workplace
It is impossible to discuss an employee’s interest in workplace
associations without first discussing the constitutional right of association
and its role in public workplaces. Although not expressly mentioned in the
text of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court recognized a
constitutional right to associate with others as an implicit part of the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment and necessary for the
advancement of those freedoms.22
The Court has recognized two distinct types of interests protected by
this broad right of association. In the first type of case, the Court
recognizes a personal liberty interest in choosing “to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships,” such as marriage.23 Thus,
for example, discharging a white female employee for her association with
black males violates the female employee’s right of association.24 In the
second type of case, “the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and
the exercise of religion.”25 The ability to associate in this context is
essential because “collective effort on behalf of shared goals”26 actually
enhances “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones.”27 Thus, the ability to join together to
promote important but sometimes controversial ideas is a way of
amplifying an individual’s voice in the marketplace of ideas.28
Both versions of the right of association have been tested in the public
employment sector. Unfortunately, no clear consensus exists as to how to
treat claims that an employer has infringed on an employee’s
constitutional right of association.29 Some courts apply the balancing test

22. Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 799 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
23. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984).
24. Langford v. City of Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262, 266 (8th Cir. 1973).
25. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
26. Id. at 622.
27. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
28. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
29. See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 696–98 (9th Cir. 2005) (detailing different
approaches among the circuits); Paul Cerkvenik, Note, Who Your Friends Are Could Get You
Fired!: The Connick “Public Concern” Test Unjustifiably Restricts Public Employees’
Associational Rights, 79 MINN. L. REV. 425, 427 (1994) (noting the division in the federal courts).
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adopted by the Supreme Court in free speech cases, which requires that an
employee’s speech or association involve a matter of public concern
before the Court will balance the employee’s interests against those of the
employer.30 Under this approach, an employer can take adverse action
against an employee for the employee’s purely private associations, such
as her marriage, unless the employer’s action violates some other aspect
of the Constitution.31 Other courts have rejected this approach, arguing that
it is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and fails to adequately
protect public employees’ association rights.32
Which approach a court uses could be significant in the case of an
employer that takes action against a third party for that party’s association
with a perceived troublemaker. Suppose, for example, that a public
employer discharges an employee based on some internal workplace
dispute and then takes action against the employee’s friend, who continues
to associate with the former employee. It is doubtful that the friend would
have a claim based on the constitutional right of association in a circuit
that requires the association involve a matter of public concern. Unless the
original firing involved, in the Supreme Court’s words, a public employee
acting as a citizen in a matter of public concern, the friend’s association
with her former coworker in the face of the employer’s disapproval would
not be constitutionally protected.33
To qualify as a matter of public concern, the issue must involve
“government policies that are of interest to the public at large,”34 rather
than a mere “internal workplace grievance[].”35 In contrast, a public
employee who is punished for associating with other employees for the
purpose of pursuing some goal of public concern or for the purpose of
expressing himself on a matter of public concern may have an association
claim under either test. For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that a police officer who was allegedly punished for joining an
organization of fellow black officers for the purpose of discussing
concerns over racial problems in the department had an association
claim.36 The existence of racism in a police department was a matter of
public concern because it affected the ability of a department to carry out
its mission.37 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that

30. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968); Cerkvenik, supra note 29, at 436.
31. Balton v. City of Milwaukee, 133 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998).
32. See Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987).
33. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006).
34. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004).
35. Id. at 83.
36. Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1320, 1331 (4th Cir. 1996).
37. Id. at 1325–26.
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an employee who intentionally associated with female employees who had
alleged sex discrimination against the employer “for the purpose of
collective expression aimed at protesting their treatment and at eradicating
systemic discriminatory and retaliatory policies” at the workplace had an
association claim following his discharge.38 According to the court, “there
is no question that the right to associate in order to show support for and
to promote political and social causes has long been protected by the First
Amendment.”39 Thus, as alleged, the plaintiff’s expressive conduct,
designed to demonstrate support for his coworkers, was a constitutionally
protected form of association.40
The only time a claim of third-party retaliation involving a matter of
public concern is likely to be rejected out of hand is when some
compelling government interest is at stake.41 For example, government
employees need the loyalty of those in policymaking or confidential
positions to fulfill their missions. Thus, when a discharged employee
occupies a policymaking or confidential position, the employer can
discharge the employee regardless whether the firing would otherwise
violate the employee’s right of association.42 This is true even when the
association in question is intimate in nature, such as that of relatives or
spouses.43 When the employee does not occupy such a policymaking or
confidential position, however, the employee’s right of association may
ultimately trump any legitimate interest the employer may have.
B. Federal Labor Law and the Right of Association
1. Mutual Aid or Protection and the Right of Association
In the words of Professor Charles J. Morris, the right of association is
“the hallmark of the design of American industrial relations.”44 Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) famously guarantees

38. Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 1993).
39. Id. at 800.
40. Id.
41. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1973 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
42. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367–68
(1976) (plurality opinion).
43. Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 1999); Soderstrum v. Town
of Grand Isle, 925 F.2d 135, 136–37 (5th Cir. 1991); Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285,
287 (7th Cir. 1985); Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 1985); see also McCabe
v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1569–70 (11th Cir. 1994) (declining to adopt any of the competing tests
in a case involving a plaintiff’s claim that she was transferred to a less desirable position due to her
marriage because plaintiff’s claim failed under all of the competing tests).
44. Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General
Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1686 (1989).
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employees the right to form or join labor organizations.45 However, § 7
does more than simply protect the ability of employees to join unions and
engage in collective bargaining. The NLRA itself expressly states that one
of its purposes is to guarantee “the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association.”46 Indeed, the Norris-LaGuardia Act47 actually declares that
it is “the public policy of the United States” that workers “have full
freedom of association,”48 a theme that is repeated in § 7.49 To that end, § 7
also guarantees employees “the right to . . . engage in . . . concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.”50 Thus, an association with other coworkers does not
necessarily have to be directed toward union organization to be
protected.51
Historically, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) interpreted
the terms of this guarantee fairly broadly. The term “concerted activities”
has not been defined so broadly so as to cover individual action that is
merely intended to benefit coworkers. But, according to the NLRB, the
term does cover situations in which other employees are simply aware of
the individual’s action on their behalf even if they do not necessarily
approve of the individual’s actions.52 The NLRB has held that concerted
activity does not include mere complaints from one employee to another
about a personal matter, but such griping can nonetheless amount to
concerted activity when the matter is of common interest to all employees
and implicit in the communication is the solicitation of support or the
attempt to incite collective action.53

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
Id. § 151.
Id. §§ 101–115.
Id. § 102.
Id. § 151. Specifically, the Act provides as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.

Id.
50. Id. § 157 (emphasis added).
51. Morris, supra note 44, at 1752.
52. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 886 (1986); John B. O’Keefe,
Preserving Collective-Action Rights In Employment Arbitration, 91 VA. L. REV. 823, 833 (2005).
53. Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248 (1997); Nat’l Wax Co., 251 N.L.R.B.
1064, 1065 (1980).
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The term “mutual aid or protection” has traditionally been interpreted
even more broadly.54 Importantly, the concept of concerted activity for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection is broad enough to protect not only the
employee who instigates the concerted activity, but also the other
employee who may take a less active role in the activity. For example, an
employee who shows solidarity with a single, aggrieved coworker engages
in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection, even
though the coworker is, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, “the only one
of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome.”55 Likewise, a
coworker “who comes or is called to the aid of a fellow employee” acts for
the purpose of mutual aid or protection.56 And inherent in the NLRB’s
repeated conclusion that a communication between a speaker and listener
may qualify as concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection is the notion that § 7 protects not only the speaker who attempts
to incite collective action, but the listener who receives the speaker’s
message.57
While lawyers frequently tend to view labor law exclusively as “union
law,” nothing within § 7 limits the extension of § 7 rights to unionized
employees.58 On several occasions, the NLRB has reaffirmed that § 7
protects non-union employees.59 Perhaps the most famous example is the
NLRB’s ruling that § 7 protects the ability of non-union employees to
discuss their wages with one another.60 According to the NLRB, the right
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection “encompasses the right of employees to ascertain what wage
rates are paid by their employer, as wages are a vital term and condition

54. See O’Keefe, supra note 52, at 832 (stating that the term has been broadly defined “to
encompass virtually any lawful activity that could be characterized as potentially benefiting
workers”); Rita Gail Smith & Richard A. Parr II, Protection of Individual Action As “Concerted
Activity” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 374 (1983) (stating
that “[c]ourts have construed ‘mutual aid or protection’ so broadly that employee action invariably
satisfies this requirement”); see also Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7:
Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 789, 790–91 (1989) (explaining that “the [NLRB] and the courts have almost invariably
rejected” as literalist reading of the “mutual aid or protection” language that would require
reciprocity or true “mutuality” of aid or protection).
55. NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1942).
56. Fischl, supra note 54, at 791.
57. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887.
58. See William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century:
Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267 (2002) (“The scope of
coverage of § 7 and its application to nonunion employees may have been one of the best-kept
secrets of labor law.”).
59. See, e.g., DuBose Masonry, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 909, 914 (1986); Triana Indus., 245
N.L.R.B. 1258, 1258 (1979).
60. Triana Indus., 245 N.L.R.B. at 1258.
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of employment.”61
The degree to which § 7 advances an employee’s right to associate for
the purpose of mutual aid or protection is perhaps best illustrated by the
ongoing debate over a non-union employee’s right to have a representative
present during an investigatory interview by the employer that the
employee reasonably believes could result in discipline. In NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc.,62 the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB’s conclusion that
an employee has a § 7 right to have a union representative present during
such an interview.63 According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he action of an
employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at
a confrontation with his employer” qualifies as concerted activity for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection because the employee’s representative
safeguards “not only the particular employee’s interest, but also the
interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make
certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of
imposing punishment unjustly.”64 While the employee’s right to have a
representative present during an investigation is crucial to fulfilling the
NLRA’s purposes, equally important is the right of the employee’s
representative to be free from retaliation for providing aid or protection.65
Without such a corresponding right to provide aid or protection, the
Weingarten right would be meaningless.
In this respect, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the recognition
of such a right is important in fulfilling the purposes of the NLRA, namely
“‘exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose
of . . . mutual aid or protection.’”66 The decision, therefore, is a recognition
that the ability of employees to associate with one another for the purpose
of mutual aid or protection helps eliminate some of the inherent inequality
in power between management and employees.67
Professor Richard Michael Fischl has suggested a slightly different, but
nonetheless related explanation behind the “mutual aid or protection”
language.68 Fischl argued that the term “represented a forthright embrace
of an ethic of solidarity ‘rooted in working-class bondings and
struggles.’”69 Thus, a faithful reading of the mutual aid or protection
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(2000)).
67.
68.
69.

Id.
420 U.S. 251 (1975).
Id. at 265–67.
Id. at 260–61.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 261–62 (omission in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151
Id. at 262.
Fischl, supra note 54, at 850–51.
Id. at 851 (quoting DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL
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requirement should advance this goal of solidarity.70 This solidarity theme
appears in Weingarten as well when the Court relied on Judge Learned
Hand’s observation about the importance of being able to seek the
assistance of coworkers: A worker who comes to the aid of another
“assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one
whom [he is] then helping; and the solidarity so established is ‘mutual aid’
in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.”71
Throughout the years, the NLRB has flip-flopped on the question
whether the Weingarten right applies in the non-union context.72 In recent
years, the NLRB also has departed from its historically broad reading of
the phrases “concerted activities” and “mutual aid or protection.”73 Despite
this, the policy in favor of encouraging employees not just to assist one
another but to associate with one another more generally remains a
bedrock principle of labor-management relations.
2. Third-Party Retaliation Claims
The federal courts have also protected employees’ association rights
under the NLRA in situations quite analogous to those described in Part I.
Courts have consistently upheld the NLRB’s ruling that § 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against a
supervisor because of a family member’s union activities, despite the fact
that supervisors would not be entitled to protection under a literal
interpretation of the NLRA’s definition of “employee.”74 In such cases, the

(1987)).
70. See id. at 842; see also Morris, supra note 44, at 1706 (stating that mutual aid or
protection “includes the aphorism, ‘misery loves company’”).
71. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 261 (quoting NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss
Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d at 505–06).
72. Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 677 (2000); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B.
230, 230–31 (1985); Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1010 (1982); Christine Neylon
O’Brien, The NLRB Waffling on Weingarten Rights, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 114 (2005). The
NLRB’s most recent decision on the subject in IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004),
concluded that no such right exists.
73. Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 301, 301 (2004) (holding that an employee who
solicited a coworker to testify on her behalf in a sexual harassment claim at a state agency
proceeding did not engage in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection);
Adelphi Inst., Inc. 287 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1073 (1988) (holding that an employee who was placed on
probation by her employer and who inquired of a coworker whether he had ever been placed on
probation did not engage in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection).
74. Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 127–28 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Kenrich
Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB (Kenrich I), 893 F.2d 1468, 1477–78 (3d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 907 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc); NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d
1086, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Dewey Bros., Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. 137, 141–42 (1970),
enforced without opinion sub nom. NLRB v. Gen. Plastics Corp., 457 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1972)
(concluding that an employer violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act by firing a supervisor because of his

14

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 59

NLRB has held that the supervisor is entitled to reinstatement or other
appropriate remedies.75
The conclusion that such third-party retaliation violates § 8(a)(1)
requires no great feat of interpretation. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights.76 Employer retaliation
directed at third parties amounts to an attempt to coerce or restrain other
employees from exercising their rights, because such retaliation is an
attempt, in the words of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, to
intimidate other employees “by showing the lengths to which the company
would go to punish one of them.”77
More interesting is the question of the appropriate remedy. As stated,
supervisors are not entitled to the protection of the NLRA.78 Moreover,
because supervisors’ should theoretically crry out the wishes of
management, several courts that have considered the issue have questioned
whether reinstatement of a supervisor is appropriate when the supervisor
is a union supporter.79 However, when there is no evidence that the
supervisor actively sided with a union, these courts have concluded that
the remedy of reinstatement is an appropriate and necessary exercise of the
NLRB’s remedial power.80 Reinstatement in such instances, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “serves to dispel employees’ fears
and concomitant reluctance to fully exercise their rights, by demonstrating
that the law sets boundaries on employers’ abilities to engage in this sort
of conduct with impunity.”81

spouse’s union activities); Consol. Foods Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. 953, 959 (1967), enforcement denied
in part sub nom. Consol. Foods Corp. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 662, 664 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam);
Golub Bros. Concessions, 140 N.L.R.B. 120, 120 (1962).
75. See, e.g., Tasty Baking Co., 254 F.3d at 130; Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB
(Kenrich II), 907 F.2d 400, 410–11 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc); Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d at
1089.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000).
77. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d at 1088.
78. Id.
79. Tasty Baking Co., 254 F.3d at 130; Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d at 1089.
80. See Tasty Baking Co., 254 F.3d at 130.
81. Kenrich II, 907 F.2d at 411; see also Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d at 1089 (upholding
the NLRB’s order of reinstatement so that other employees “will not be deterred from exercising
their rights under § 7 by fear that if they do the company will try to get back at them in any way
it can, including by firing their relatives”).
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C. The Right of Association and the Americans with Disabilities Act
1. Section 12112(b)(4) of the ADA and Associational Discrimination
The most explicit recognition found in federal anti-discrimination law
of an employee’s right of association is the Americans with Disabilities
Act’s (ADA) prohibition against discrimination based on one’s association
with an individual with a disability. Typically, to have standing under Title
I of the ADA, an employee must be a “qualified individual with a
disability.”82 However, § 12112(b)(4) of the ADA expressly prohibits an
employer from discriminating against a non-disabled individual because
of the individual’s association with a qualified individual with a
disability.83
The only indication from the legislative history as to the genesis of
§ 12112(b)(4) is a reference to a mother who was fired from her job after
moving in to care for her son, who had AIDS.84 Given the widespread
misperceptions and fears surrounding certain infectious diseases (and most
notably AIDS) at the time of the ADA’s consideration, it seems likely that
§ 12112(b)(4) reflected Congress’s recognition that “society’s
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease”85 are just as
pernicious when directed at those who associate with individuals with
disabilities as when they are directed at those with disabilities
themselves.86
As case law involving § 12112(b)(4) has developed, however, there
have been relatively few published cases involving such forms of pure
discrimination. Instead, ADA plaintiffs most frequently assert a violation
of § 12112(b)(4) when an employer takes adverse action against the
plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s attendance problems resulting from having
to care for an individual with a disability.87 In other words, § 12112(b)(4)
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
83. Id. § 12112(b)(4).
84. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on Select
Education of the H.R. Comm. on Education and Labor, 100th Cong. 77 (1988); Lawrence D.
Rosenthal, Association Discrimination Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: Another Uphill
Battle for Potential ADA Plaintiffs, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP., L.J. 132, 137 (2004).
85. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
86. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 84, at 137 (explaining that the inclusion of the
association provision reflects Congress’s belief that employers should not be permitted to
discriminate against an individual based on the employer’s fear of another’s illness).
87. In this respect, § 12112(b)(4) closely resembles the anti-retaliation mandate of the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which likewise prohibits an employer from taking adverse action
against an employee who exercises his statutory right to take unpaid leave to care for a relative with
a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000); id. § 2615(a). ADA plaintiffs have
experienced significant difficulty prevailing on such claims for a host of reasons, including the fact
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operates in practice not so much as a tool to protect an employee whose
association with an individual whose physical or mental impairment might
provoke fear or discomfort on the part of an employer, but as more of a
social welfare measure related to family responsibilities and regular
attendance. Still, as originally conceived, § 12112(b)(4) is a powerful
statement that affirms the importance of protecting third parties from the
harmful consequences of discriminatory attitudes.
2. Section 12203(b) of the ADA and Associational Discrimination
Another portion of the ADA also addresses employer action targeted
at third parties. Section 12203(a) of the ADA parallels § 704(a) of Title
VII in that both provisions make it unlawful to retaliate against an
individual because the individual opposed an employer’s unlawful
practices or participated in a proceeding under the ADA.88 However,
§ 12203(b) goes on to make it unlawful
to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of
his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his
or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by
this chapter.89
The language of § 12203(b) differs from Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision in several respects.
Although the line between retaliation and intimidation is often blurry
at best, § 12203(b) is more accurately described as an anti-coercion or
anti-intimidation measure than an anti-retaliation measure.90 In addition,
§ 12203(a) protects not just those who oppose unlawful conduct or
participate in a proceeding but also those who simply exercise their rights
under the ADA or who assist others in doing so.91 Thus, for example, the
provision has been held to cover a husband who spoke to his wife’s
supervisor about his wife’s need for a reasonable accommodation at
work.92

that employers are not required to modify a leave policy for an employee who needs time off to
care for a relative with a disability. See Rosenthal, supra note 84, at 169–70.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000) ; id. § 2000e-3(a).
89. Id. § 12203(b).
90. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 84, at 135 (distinguishing between the ADA’s “anticoercion” and “anti-retaliation” provisions).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
92. Barker v. Int’l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 16 (D. Me. 1998).
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Section 12203(b) also is broader than § 704(a) of Title VII in that it
probably protects those individuals who are the victims of pure third-party
retaliation. The language of § 12203(b) is actually derived from preexisting labor law.93 In Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc.,94 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the obvious similarity with
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which likewise prohibits an employer from
interfering with or coercing employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights.95
Fogleman involved a retaliation claim filed by a son who alleged that he
was discharged in retaliation for his father’s suit against the same
employer.96 The court previously concluded that an employer violates
§ 8(a)(1) by discharging a supervisor because of a family member’s union
activities, and that the supervisor in such a case may be entitled to
reinstatement.97 Recognizing the similarity of statutory texts, the court
concluded that a retaliation plaintiff may proceed under § 12203(b) just as
he would under § 8(a)(1).98 Thus, the court permitted the plaintiff to
proceed with his claim of pure third-party retaliation under § 12203(b).99
III.

THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION OF TITLE VII AND THE
TROUBLEMAKER’S FRIEND

The implicit and sometimes explicit recognition of the value of
employees’ association interest that is present in many federal decisions
stands in marked contrast to the federal courts’ treatment of retaliation
claims that involve the associates of individuals who have engaged in
protected activity under Title VII or who are contemplating such action.
While courts have interpreted Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision in
a way that at least indirectly protects employees’ association interest, the
courts have been less generous in their interpretation of the statute’s antiretaliation provision.

93. See Mark C. Weber, Workplace Harassment Claims Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A New Interpretation, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 241, 257 (2003) (stating that
§ 12203(b)’s language originated in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and continued
through the NLRA and Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152(3)–(4)).
94. 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002).
95. Id. at 564; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
96. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564.
97. Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB (Kenrich II), 907 F.2d at 411 (3d Cir. 1990) (en
banc); Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB (Kenrich I), 893 F.2d 1468, 1477–78 (3d Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 907 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir.1990) (en banc).
98. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570.
99. Id.
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A. Title VII’s Indirect Protection of the Right of Association
Unlike the NLRA and the ADA, Title VII does not directly address an
individual’s right to associate with coworkers. Instead, to the extent that
Title VII protects employees’ freedom of association, the statute does so
in less obvious and more indirect ways. One situation in which Title VII
protects an individual’s right of association is when an employer objects
to an employee’s association with another individual of a particular race,
gender, or religion, and the employer takes adverse action against the
employee.100 Initially, courts were somewhat reluctant to allow a plaintiff
to proceed under Title VII after suffering an adverse employment action
because, for example, she was involved in romantic relationship with a
person of another race or because she was friends with such individuals.101
Courts reasoned that the employer in such a case was discriminating on the
basis of the other party’s race, not the plaintiff’s.102 Thus, a white
employee who was fired after continuing to associate with his black
coworkers after having been ordered not to do so did not have a claim
under Title VII.103
In time, courts began to recognize the fallacy of such reasoning. In
Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists,104 the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York explained that
discrimination against a plaintiff stemming from an employer’s
disapproval of the plaintiffs’ interracial association was, in fact,
discrimination because of the plaintiff’s race.105 In Whitney, the plaintiff
alleged she had been fired because her employer disapproved of her
“casual social relationship” with a black male.106 The court rejected the
defendant’s argument that, if true, such conduct amounted only to
discrimination against the friend, explaining that “if [the plaintiff] was
discharged because, as alleged, the defendant disapproved of a social
relationship between a white woman and a black man, the plaintiff’s race
was as much a factor in the decision to fire her as that of her friend.”107
Based on the logic of Whitney, it is now well-established that such
discrimination violates Title VII.108

100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
101. Parr v. United Family Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. C-83-26-6, 1983 WL 1774, at *1–2 (N.D.
Ga. June 15, 1983); Adams v. Governor’s Comm. on Post-Secondary Educ., 504 F. Supp. 30, 31
(N.D. Ga. 1980); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 207, 214–15 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
102. Parr, 1983 WL 1774, at *2.
103. Ripp, 366 F. Supp. at 208–09.
104. 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
105. Id. at 1366.
106. Id. at 1365.
107. Id. at 1366.
108. See, e.g., Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir.
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To be sure, most of the courts that have held that discrimination on the
basis of interracial associations violates Title VII have not expressly done
so on the ground of protecting employees’ association interests. In such
cases, courts typically refer to the right to be free from racial
discrimination as the right being protected in such instances.109 Prohibiting
such employer conduct does, however, at least indirectly advance
employees’ right to associate with whomever they choose, at least when
their employers’ reasons for opposing such relationships are
discriminatory in nature.110 On occasion, courts actually address such cases
explicitly in terms of a right of association.111 In Johnson v. University of
Cincinnati,112 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “in order to state
a cognizable claim under Title VII, the plaintiff . . . need only allege that
he was discriminated against on the basis of his association with a member
of a recognized protected class.”113 According to the Sixth Circuit, a
plaintiff complaining of such associational discrimination need not even
allege that he was discriminated against on the basis of race in order to
state a claim under Title VII because the race of the individual with whom
the plaintiff associated is “imputed” to the plaintiff.114 Therefore, Johnson
exemplifies how Title VII can at least indirectly protect the right of
association in the workplace.
B. The Troublemaker’s Friend and the Current Split Involving Pure
Third-Party Retaliation Claims
One area where courts have been less willing to protect employees’
association interests is in the case of pure third-party retaliation. Courts
occasionally present the question whether § 704(a) of Title VII prohibits
an employer from discriminating against a third party in retaliation for the
protected activities of another individual as a question whether to read into
the statute a third-party retaliation cause of action.115 The relevant portion
of Title VII provides that it is unlawful

1986).
109. See, e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir.
1998).
110. See, e.g., Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., 868 F. Supp 1138, 1143–44 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
111. See id. at 1143 (“A white person’s right to associate with African-Americans is protected
by § 1981.”).
112. 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000).
113. Id. at 574.
114. Id. at 575 (citing Tetro v. Elliott, Popham, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks,
Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 1999)).
115. EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 326 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
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for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.116
The statute’s use of the word “he” clearly seems to indicate that the person
complaining of unlawful retaliation also must have been the person
participating in the protected activity.117
This language contrasts with similar provisions in the NLRA and the
ADA, which do afford protection for the “innocent bystanders” who
associate with an individual engaging in protected activity.118 Given Title
VII’s failure to specifically address discrimination against third parties, the
most natural reading of the statutory text would seem to lead to the
conclusion that no claim lies for merely being associated with an
individual who has engaged in protected activities.119 An employee who
somehow assists a coworker who is herself engaging in protected activities
is protected.120 But the language of § 704(a) does not expressly cover the
situation when an employer takes action against the employee simply
because the employee happens to have some relationship with the
troublemaking coworker.
Courts that have been willing to read such a cause of action into Title
VII have done so largely on the premise that not permitting such claims
would, in effect, make a mockery of the goals of anti-discrimination law.
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of statutory anti-retaliation

116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
contains a similar provision. The relevant portion of the ADEA provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment . . . because such individual, member or applicant
for membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or
because such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or litigation under this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000).
117. Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A Practitioner’s Guide to
Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REV. 451, 484 (2002).
118. See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text (discussing labor law); supra notes 94–99
and accompanying text (discussing ADA cases).
119. See Gregory, supra note 117, at 484–85 (stating that the “language of the statute cannot
be read as plainly supporting the position that the statute prohibits third-party retaliations,” but that
“the literal terms of the statute might support” the opposite reading).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
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provisions is to “maintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms.”121 Several courts have recognized that permitting an
employer to retaliate against a third-party would allow an employer to
accomplish indirectly what it is prohibited from accomplishing directly.122
Such associational retaliation would deter individuals who believe they
have been discriminated against from exercising their statutory rights, thus
frustrating the purpose of statutory anti-retaliation provisions.123
The arguments in favor of permitting the ultimate victims of an
employer’s pure third-party retaliation to sue under Title VII are
compelling. However, to adopt this position, one must still contend with
the language of the provisions, the most natural reading of which would
preclude such claims. Moreover, courts that have rejected such claims of
pure third-party retaliation have suggested several possible reasons why
Congress might have chosen not to extend to third parties the right to be
free from retaliation. These include the argument that many individuals
who assert such claims will already be protected because they “will have
participated in some manner in a coworker’s charge of discrimination”124
and the argument that permitting such suits “would open the door to
frivolous lawsuits and interfere with an employer’s prerogative to fire atwill employees.”125 In Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals acknowledged that while it did not find these possible
policy justifications “particularly convincing,” they were “at least
plausible policy reasons why Congress might have intended to exclude
third-party retaliation claims.”126 Other courts have raised slippery-slope
arguments in the Title VII context, questioning, if a spouse may bring a
third-party retaliation claim, whether “other relatives, close friends, lifepartners or long-time co-workers” could as well.127
Regardless of the justification offered, the majority of courts to
consider the question have concluded that a plaintiff who alleges

121. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
122. Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 2000);
EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
123. De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D.D.C. 1978); see also Fogleman v.
Mercy Hosp. Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568–69 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that permitting an employer
to engage in such action would deter employees from exercising their statutory rights, but
nonetheless concluding by refusing to recognize third-party retaliation claims).
124. Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996).
125. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569–70; Singh v. Green Thumb Landscaping, Inc., 390 F. Supp.
2d 1129, 1138 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
126. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569.
127. Sukenic v. Maricopa County, No. Civ. 02-02438, 2004 WL 3522690, at *12 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 7, 2004); see also EEOC v. Bojangles Rest., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 326 (M.D.N.C. 2003)
(“The number of lawsuits which could spawn from this rule could be enormous in a company of
any size.”).
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retaliation based solely upon the plaintiff’s association with another
individual who has engaged in protected statutory activities does not have
a claim under Title VII.128 Therefore, while the “sins” of the troublemaker
may be imputed to a friend or relative by the employer, the protection
afforded the troublemaker by federal law is not imputed to friends or
relatives under the majority approach. As a result, the friends, cousins,
siblings, children, and spouses of workplace troublemakers are likely to be
denied coverage under Title VII when they have been retaliated against for
their association with an individual who has opposed an employer’s
allegedly unlawful discrimination or who has participated in a proceeding
related to such behavior on the part of an employer.
C. The Troublemaker’s Friend and the Lack of Coverage Under
Section 704(a) for Participation in an Employer’s
Internal Investigation Process
Federal courts have also lessened employees’ association interests in
other ways. By employing a demanding standard with regard to what
qualifies as protected conduct for purposes of a retaliation claim, some
federal courts have left employees who assist their coworkers with respect
to charges of discrimination vulnerable to employer retaliation. And by
classifying an employee’s participation in an employers process for
investigating discrimination complaints as opposition conduct for purposes
of Title VII, courts have left employees more vulnerable to employer
retaliation than they otherwise might be.
1. Participation in an Employer’s Internal Investigation Process and
Coverage of the Troublemaker Under the Opposition Clause
The predominant approach of the federal courts also lessens
employees’ association interests when employees seek the assistance of
coworkers during internal investigations of workplace harassment. The
Supreme Court has provided employers with a strong incentive to establish
an internal mechanism for investigating and resolving employee
complaints of harassment. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton129 and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,130 the Supreme Court established a
two-part affirmative defense by which employers may cut off liability for
harassment by a supervisor that does not result in a tangible employment
action, such as termination or demotion.131 To satisfy the first prerequisite,
an employer must have “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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promptly any harassing behavior.”132 This is typically satisfied by having
in place an effective internal investigation process that can address the
complaint of harassment.133 To satisfy the second prerequisite, an
employer must establish that the employee “unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”134
In addition to creating a strong incentive for employers to establish
effective internal mechanisms for addressing harassment complaints, the
Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense also gives employees a strong
incentive to report instances of workplace harassment because the failure
to do so is likely to prevent the employee from holding the employer
liable. The problem, however, is that the most common reason for not
reporting harassment is the fear of employer retaliation.135 Indeed, given
the prevalence of retaliation in the workplace for just such behavior,136
employees’ reluctance may be justified in many instances. However, the
federal courts generally have been unsympathetic to plaintiffs who have
not reported instances of workplace harassment to an employer out of
“generalized fears of retaliation.”137 Courts typically classify the failure to
use an employer’s internal mechanism for such reasons as unjustified for
purposes of the Ellerth–Faragher defense.138 It is only when the
employee’s fears are grounded on a more specific basis, such as prior
retaliation by the employer, that the failure to report is likely to be
excused.139
Moreover, employees also have an incentive to report objectionable
behavior as soon as it occurs. In one instance, a Title VII plaintiff waited
several months before reporting her supervisor’s alleged harassment

132. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
133. See Lissau v. S. Food Serv., 159 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating the fact that an
employer has “disseminated an effective anti-harassment policy provides compelling proof of its
efforts to prevent workplace harassment”).
134. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
135. See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and
Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 122
(1995).
136. Id. at 122–23 (describing results of surveys finding that between 1/3 and 62% of
individuals who filed internal complaints of harassment experienced some form of retaliation); see
Barnard & Rapp, supra note 12, at 658 (stating that retaliation claims have doubled in the last
decade and now comprise 25% of EEOC charges).
137. Edward A. Marshall, Excluding Participation in Internal Complaint Mechanisms from
Absolute Retaliation Protection: Why Everyone, Including the Employer, Loses, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 549, 579 (2001). See generally Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The
Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 374 (2004) (noting the high standard to
which courts hold employees with respect to the reporting requirement).
138. Marshall, supra note 137, at 579.
139. Id.
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because, she said, “she needed time to collect evidence against [the
superior] so company officials would believe her” and because she thought
the superior might simply be an “‘interested man’ who could be politely
rebuffed.”140 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected this excuse for
the delay, concluding that the plaintiff had unreasonably failed to avail
herself of the employer’s internal complaint procedure.141 The message
from the Fourth Circuit then, is when in doubt, report.
Unfortunately, employees who report internally run the very real risk
that the act of reporting will not be protected conduct for purposes of a
retaliation claim, thus leaving them vulnerable to employer retaliation.
Section 704(a) contains two distinct clauses: the opposition clause, which
applies when an employee opposes unlawful conduct, and the participation
clause, which applies when an employee participates in a proceeding.142
The federal courts uniformly have held that resort to an employer’s
internal procedures for handling discrimination does not fall under the
participation clause for purposes of a retaliation claim, at least prior to the
filing of an EEOC charge, because such conduct does not relate to an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing authorized by Title VII.143 Instead,
such activity is protected, if at all, under the opposition clause.144 The only
time that participation in an internal investigation or proceeding is likely
to be characterized as protected activity falling under the participation
clause is when the internal proceeding occurs pursuant to a previously
filed EEOC charge.145
The rationale underlying the dominant approach is based almost
entirely on statutory construction. Under the participation clause, an
individual is protected from retaliation when “he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”146 Relying on this language,
the courts have concluded that the “investigation, proceeding, or hearing”
language refers only to those mechanisms that are authorized by statute
and are part of the “machinery available to seek redress for civil rights

140. Id.
141. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2001).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
143. See, e.g., EEOC v. Total Sys. Serv., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000).
144. Id.; Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998);
Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989). At least one state appellate court has reached the contrary
result when interpreting an identically worded statute. McLemore v. Detroit Receiving Hosp. &
Univ. Med. Ctr., 493 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
145. Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2003); Dorothy E. Larkin,
Participation Anxiety: Should Title VII’s Participation Clause Protect Employees Participating in
Internal Investigations, 33 GA. L. REV. 1181, 1197–98 (1999).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
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violations.”147 Other courts have defined the concept in a slightly looser
fashion, stating that conduct falls under the participation clause if it is “an
intimately related and integral step in the process of making a formal
charge.”148 Ultimately, however, under the overwhelming majority
approach, the investigation, proceeding, or hearing must have its basis in
the statutory framework of Title VII.
This distinction between coverage under the opposition clause versus
coverage under the participation clause is significant. The scope of
protection for activity falling under the participation clause is significantly
broader than for activity falling under the opposition clause.149 Indeed,
protection under the participation clause is virtually absolute. While the
participation clause protects those who participate “in any manner” in a
Title VII proceeding,150 protection under the opposition clause is more
limited. Some forms of opposition, such as illegal acts, will be
unprotected.151
Perhaps the most significant limitation to coverage under the
opposition clause is the requirement that an individual must have a good
faith, objectively reasonable belief that the conduct she is opposing is
unlawful.152 In some instances, courts appear to hold employees to the
standard of what a reasonable labor and employment attorney would
believe, rather than what a reasonable employee would believe.153 In
Talanda v. KFC National Management Co., for example, the plaintiff
complained to his supervisor and refused to follow her order that the
plaintiff remove a coworker with dental problems and missing teeth from
a front-counter position because the supervisor was afraid of how
customers would react to the presence of the individual.154 The employer
fired the plaintiff allegedly in response to the plaintiff’s reaction to the

147. Booker, 879 F.2d at 1313.
148. Croushorn v. Bd. of Trs., 518 F. Supp. 9, 23 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
149. Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312. The rationale for the distinction is that the language of the
participation clause is linked directly to Title VII’s remedial framework, thereby implying that
activities under the participation clause are essential to that remedial framework. Laughlin, 149
F.3d at 259 n.4; Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
151. Hochstadt v. Worcester Found., 545 F.2d 222, 231–32 (1st Cir. 1976).
152. See, e.g., Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1125 (8th Cir. 2006); Byers
v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000).
153. See generally Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the
plaintiff lacked an objectively reasonable belief that he was opposing unlawful conduct by reporting
to management a coworker’s statement, “Nobody runs this team but a bunch of niggers and I’m
going to get rid of them”); Brake, supra note 2, at 99 (criticizing the good–faith, reasonable belief
standard on the grounds that the standard is “self-consciously narrowed to that of a person with
‘the’ perfect understanding of law and legal reasoning—that is, the judge who applies the
reasonable belief standard in that particular case”).
154. Talanda v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1998).
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order.155 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could
not reasonably have believed that he was opposing unlawful conduct
because there was no way he could reasonably have believed his coworker
had a disability under the ADA.156 The court reached this conclusion
despite the fact that the EEOC has used a nearly identical scenario to
illustrate when an employer illegally discriminates against an individual
the employer regards as having a disability. According to the EEOC’s
Interpretive Guidance, an employer regards an individual as having a
disability when the individual has an impairment (such as a disfigurement
or anatomical loss) that is substantially limiting only because of the
attitudes of others toward the condition.157 The Guidance goes on to state
that “[i]f an employer discriminates against such an individual because of
the negative reactions of others, the employer would be regarding the
individual as disabled and acting on the basis of that perceived
disability.”158 So, despite the fact that this is almost exactly what happened
in Talanda, the court said, based on ADA case law, that the plaintiff
lacked a reasonable belief that the conduct he was opposing was unlawful
under the ADA.159
In Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,160 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals took a similarly restrictive approach. Robert Jordan, a black
employee, overheard a white employee say of two recently arrested
criminal suspects, “They should put those two black monkeys in a cage
with a bunch of black apes and let the apes f-k them.”161 After discussing
the incident with coworkers, Jordan learned that the employee had made
similar statements in the past.162 He subsequently reported the incident to
management and was fired a month later.163 When Jordan sued on a
retaliation theory, the Fourth Circuit held that his internal complaint did
not constitute protected opposition conduct.164 The court concluded that
“no objectively reasonable person could have believed” that a racially
hostile work environment existed or was about to develop.165
As Jordan illustrates, individuals who face what they believe to be
workplace discrimination face a difficult choice. If they fail to report, they
lose the ability to hold the employer liable in a future lawsuit. If they

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1097.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2007).
Id.
Talanda, 140 F.3d at 1098.
447 F.3d 324 (4th Cir.), vacated, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 5, 2006).
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 333–34.
Id. at 332.
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report, they cannot claim the protection of Title VII’s expansive
participation clause and may be held to a demanding standard of
reasonableness that may leave them without the protection of the more
narrow opposition clause.166 And, as Jordan illustrates, this lack of
protection may be significant. By using the employer’s procedures, the
employee may quickly be labeled a troublemaker who is overly sensitive,
disagreeable, or incapable of handling the situation on his own, thereby
making him a more likely target of retaliation.167
The majority approach also allows employers to preemptively retaliate
against an employee prior to the filing of a formal charge of
discrimination. An employee who files an internal complaint regarding
workplace discrimination certainly raises at least the specter of a formal
discrimination claim.168 With an internal complaint pending, it is not
difficult for the employer to imagine that a formal EEOC charge may be
forthcoming. Thus, under the majority rule, the employer could take action
against the employee before such action comes to pass and theoretically
be immune from a future retaliation claim.169 The employer who does so
may be unable to rely upon the existence of its internal process as
satisfying the Ellerth–Faragher defense in a future case because the
employer’s actions tend to establish that its process is not effective and
that an employee would be justified in not using the process.170 However,
the purpose of retaliation is often less about punishing the troublemaking
employee than it is about sending a message to future troublemakers. And
the employer who can retaliate with impunity can send a very clear
message to its employees regarding its tolerance for dissent.
2. Participation in an Employer’s Internal Investigation Process
and Coverage of the Troublemaker’s Friend
Under the Opposition Clause
To be sure, the Catch-22 at issue in these cases is one faced mainly by
the troublemaking employee. However, the federal courts’ interpretations
166. See id. at 336 (King, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion that an
African-American employee who heard a coworker refer to other African-Americans as “black
monkeys” in a roomful of other employees could not reasonably have believed that such conduct
violated Title VII).
167. See generally Brake, supra note 2, at 32, 39 (stating that “women and racial minorities
are perceived as troublemakers and hypersensitive when they confront discrimination” and that
retaliation is most likely to occur against those who lack the support of organizational
powerbrokers).
168. McLemore v. Detroit Receiving Hosp. & Univ. Med. Ctr., 493 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992).
169. Id.
170. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining that a failure to report harassment
may be viewed as justified by courts when there is a history of prior retaliation by the employer).
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of the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense and Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision also have significant implications for coworkers of the
troublemaker and the right of workplace association more generally. There
are at least two ways in which the friends of workplace troublemakers may
be adversely affected by these decisions.
a. The Lack of Protection Under the Opposition Clause for Providing
Assistance During an Internal Investigation
First, the majority approaches potentially may expose the
troublemaker’s friend to the possibility of retaliation if the friend provides
assistance related to the troublemaker’s internal complaint. In many
instances, an employee will have little way of knowing whether her
concerns over treatment by a supervisor or other individual are valid and
whether the supervisor’s actions approach the level of discrimination
without obtaining more information.171 Because an employee’s belief that
the employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination must be objectively
reasonable, an employee actually has an incentive to ask around the
workplace to better understand her situation before invoking the
employer’s internal mechanism for addressing workplace
discrimination.172 Coworkers may have greater information than the
troublemaker—either about the incident in question or the law of the
workplace more generally—that may be valuable to the troublemaker.
Indeed, in Jordan, the plaintiff actually discussed the “black apes” incident
with coworkers and learned of similar incidents before deciding to report
the incident to management. Simply asking coworkers whether they have
experienced similar treatment at the hands of a supervisor, however, is
unlikely to rise to the level of opposition conduct.173 While an employee’s
opposition to unlawful conduct need not take any particular form, to fall
under the opposition clause, the conduct must indicate in some manner that
the employee is complaining about or is in some manner taking a stand
against perceived unlawful conduct.174 Absent such behavior, a discussion
171. See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
an employee’s explanation that she needed more time to ascertain whether supervisor was a
“predator” before taking advantage of her employer’s anti-harassment policy).
172. Larkin, supra note 145, at 1184 (stating that employees should be wary about
participating in their employer’s internal investigations in light of the differing levels of protection
afforded protection and opposition conduct).
173. Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 447 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir.), vacated, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 5, 2006).
174. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating
that opposition conduct encompasses “staging informal protests and voicing one's opinions in order
to bring attention to an employer’s discriminatory activities”); Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899
F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that opposition conduct includes “informal protests of
discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to management, writing critical
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with a coworker about past events that occurs prior to the filing of an
internal complaint or an EEOC charge is unlikely to qualify as either
opposition or participation conduct.
As importantly, in seeking information from a coworker, an employee
concerned about possible discrimination may potentially be subjecting that
coworker to adverse action by the employer. Expressing support for
coworkers who oppose discrimination may constitute opposition conduct,
as may assisting coworkers in their formal discrimination claims.175 But if
an employee who seeks information from coworkers in an attempt to better
understand whether the employee has been discriminated against has not
engaged in protected opposition conduct, neither is it likely that the
coworker who simply responds to the inquiring employee’s request
without expressing an opinion about the employer’s conduct has engaged
in protected opposition activity under Title VII. Likewise, if, as is the
prevailing approach, an employee who resorts to an employer’s internal
anti-discrimination process is not engaging in protected participation
conduct,176 neither is a coworker who provides assistance to the
troublemaker contemplating the filing of an internal complaint of
discrimination.
Nor is an employee likely to be covered when she assists a coworker
after the filing of an internal complaint but prior to the filing of a formal
charge with the EEOC. For example, in Laughlin v. Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority,177 Kathy LaSauce filed an internal
complaint with her employer, alleging that her supervisor had retaliated
against her for providing testimony in another employee’s EEOC action.178
LaSauce eventually resigned and sued the employer. Prior to LaSauce’s
lawsuit, however, Karen Laughlin, a coworker who also happened to be
the secretary to an individual who had been involved in the internal
complaint process, uncovered potentially damaging evidence concerning
the employer’s alleged retaliation against LaSauce. Laughlin found an
unsigned, written warning letter from her boss to the individual who had
allegedly retaliated against LaSauce. The warning letter criticized the
individual for his retaliatory actions against LaSauce and was dated prior
to LaSauce’s resignation. The fact that the letter was never sent, along with
letters to customers, protesting against discrimination by industry or by society in general, and
expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges”); Booker v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989) (“An employee may not invoke the protections
of the Act by making a vague charge of discrimination.”); Comiskey v. Auto. Indus. Action Group,
40 F. Supp. 2d 877, 898 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (stating that to qualify as opposition conduct, an
employee needs to make “an overt stand against suspected illegal discriminatory action”).
175. McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996); Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209.
176. See supra note 143.
177. 149 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1998).
178. Id. at 256.

30

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 59

some other circumstances, led Laughlin to conclude that a cover-up was
taking place to prevent LaSauce from obtaining relevant information for
any future lawsuit. Consequently, Laughlin photocopied the letter and
some other documents and sent them to LaSauce. When Laughlin’s actions
were discovered, she was discharged.179
After the employer prevailed on its summary judgment motion,
Laughlin appealed and argued that her assistance to LaSauce was
absolutely privileged under the participation clause.180 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected Laughlin’s argument, concluding, in accordance
with the majority rule, that because LaSauce had not yet filed a formal
discrimination complaint, Laughlin was not assisting in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under Title VII.181 Instead, her actions fell under the
less-expansive opposition clause.182 Weighing the employer’s interest in
maintaining the security and confidentiality of sensitive personnel
documents against Laughlin’s interest in providing the documents to
LaSauce, the court “easily conclude[d]” that Laughlin’s actions were
unprotected under the opposition clause.183
While one may take issue with Laughlin’s actions, the majority
position with respect to coverage under the participation clause for
assistance rendered prior to the filing of a charge of discrimination would
apply with equal force to a more sympathetic plaintiff. Without the
assurance of absolute protection from retaliation provided by the
participation clause, workplace troublemakers are not the only individuals
left vulnerable to employer retaliation. Coworkers may also be less willing
to assist or perhaps even associate with the victims of workplace
discrimination prior to the filing of a formal charge of discrimination.
Given the fact that the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense strongly
encourages employers to adopt internal complaint procedures,184 it is likely
that these types of issues will appear with increasing frequency in the
coming years.
b. Discouraging Troublemakers From Complaining on
Behalf of Coworkers
The majority approaches also disadvantage a troublemaker’s coworkers
by discouraging the troublemaker from standing up for coworkers’ rights.

179. Id.
180. Id. at 257–58.
181. Id. at 259. Indeed, because LaSauce already had resigned by the time Laughlin
photocopied the letter, there arguably was not even an internal investigation or proceeding that was
taking place. Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 952 F. Supp. 1129, 1134 (E.D. Va. 1997).
182. Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259.
183. Id. at 260.
184. See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.
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Majority group employees have had virtually no success in their
discrimination claims premised upon the argument that an employer’s
treatment of minority group employees resulted in a hostile working
environment for members of the majority group.185 When, however, these
troublemakers have allegedly been retaliated against for complaining about
working environments that are hostile toward their coworkers, courts have
been more willing to allow such claims to proceed under a retaliation
theory.186 Nothing in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision requires that the
hostile environment an employee opposes be hostile toward that
employee.187 Therefore, the opposition clause protects selfless as well as
selfish acts of opposition.
Employees who act, at least in part, out of a desire to protect their
coworkers from unlawful discrimination have hardly enjoyed unqualified
success in pursuing retaliation claims, however.188 In addition to the often
difficult task of showing that there was a causal connection between the
employer’s action and the protected activity, internal troublemakers face
the initial difficulty of establishing that they possessed a good faith,
reasonable belief that the complained-of conduct was unlawful.189 In
Jordan, for example, the plaintiff claimed to have filed an internal
complaint because he feared that a hostile work environment either existed
or was about to develop.190 While the plaintiff himself had heard the other
employee make only one racist comment, his belief was based in part on
the fact that two of his coworkers told the plaintiff that they had heard the
other employee make racist statements “many times before.”191 Therefore,
a plausible interpretation of the events is that the plaintiff complained not
just because he believed that a hostile environment existed or was
developing toward him, but because a hostile environment already existed
or was developing toward his coworkers.

185. Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup
Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 67 (2002).
186. Id. at 93.
187. Id.
188. See Lewis v. St. Cloud State Univ., 467 F.3d 1133, 1138 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of an employer when an employee was allegedly retaliated against for
“advocating or supporting rights of minorities and faculty of color”); Talanda v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt.
Co., 140 F.3d 1090, 1098 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment against an employee who
was allegedly retaliated against after raising the possibility that treatment of a coworker violated
ADA); Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 958–59 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary
judgment against a white employee who was allegedly retaliated against after complaining about
racist statements about African-Americans by a coworker).
189. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
190. Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 447 F.3d 324, 329 (4th Cir.), vacated, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 5, 2006).
191. Id. at 336 (King, J., dissenting).
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As Jordan illustrates, however, an employee who complains internally
runs the risk of being labeled a troublemaker and being left unprotected by
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. This certainly would have the
tendency to discourage selfless acts of opposition. As a result, the victims
of such discrimination may be less likely to receive the assistance of
coworkers.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE MAJORITY APPROACHES ON THE RIGHT OF
ASSOCIATON IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
The majority approaches regarding Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
described above undercut the policy in favor of freedom of association in
the workplace. At a minimum, they tend to discourage employees from
associating with and assisting one another. Ultimately, this has adverse
consequences for the ability of Title VII to combat workplace
discrimination.
A. The Impact on Employees’ Association Interests
The “right of association” may be defined in various ways. The concept
may be broad enough to include the protection of intimate associations
simply for their own sake.192 Alternatively, it may be defined so as to
include the encouragement of worker solidarity or more narrowly so as to
protect only those associations that are entered into for the purpose of
providing assistance or otherwise effectuating change.193 Regardless of
how the concept is defined, the majority interpretations of § 704(a) tend
to offend the notion of freedom of association.
Federal law has generally taken a dim view of the ability of an
employer to dictate with whom its employees may associate with when the
associations touch upon matters of public concern beyond the individual
workplace in question. Admittedly, one must be cautious about
overgeneralizations when comparing public workplace law with private
workplace law and unionized settings with non–unionized settings. But the
theme of protecting employees’ ability to associate with whomever they
choose when the association somehow impacts broader policy concerns
occurs too frequently to ignore in labor and employment law.
The broadest conception of this “right” of association can be found in
federal labor law, which explicitly touts as one of the nation’s goals the
encouragement of employees to join together for the purpose of collective

192. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text; supra notes 66–67 and accompanying
text.
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bargaining and mutual aid or protection.194 Moving farther along the
spectrum, many of the public employment cases take a more conservative
view of employees’ associational rights in that they limit employee claims
to situations when the association involves expressive conduct related to
a matter of public concern.195 However, these cases nonetheless recognize
that public values are offended when employers take adverse action
against individual employees based on associations that themselves
implicate matters of concern beyond a particular workplace.196
The requirement that an association must somehow advance or relate
to a matter of importance beyond the immediate parties to merit legal
protection is also consistent with the common law’s recognition of limited
exceptions to an employer’s absolute right to discharge employees for any
reason. State courts have not been receptive to wrongful discharge claims
based upon an employer’s disapproval of an employee’s relationship with
another, absent special circumstances. Thus, for example, plaintiffs have
generally had little success in claiming protection under state common law
when they have been discharged for marrying or dating someone of whom
the employer disapproves.197 By the same token, state legislatures have
been reluctant to create statutory causes of action premised upon a broad
right of association.198 Where such statutes exist, they sometimes limit
employees’ association rights to situations involving matters of broader
public importance or have been interpreted by state courts in a manner that
limits the overall reach of the statute.199 When, however, an employer
takes adverse action against an employee on the basis of the employee’s
association with another, and that action somehow offends the public’s
interest in combating discrimination or thwarts some other clearly

194. See supra Part II.B.1.
195. See supra notes 29–43 and accompanying text.
196. Admittedly, the associations in these cases need not involve associations with coworkers
for an individual employee’s action to be protected. But neither have courts hesitated to protect
employees’ associational interests when the association is with a coworker and the employer’s
action somehow offends public values. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing
the constitutional protection afforded to a public employee who seeks to make a statement through
the act of associating with other employees who have allegedly been the victims of discrimination).
197. See, e.g., Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854, 857 (Or. 1986) (rejecting a wrongful
discharge claim based upon the employer’s discharge of an employee for dating coworker),
abrogated by McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841 (Or. 1995); McClusky v. Clark Oil & Ref.
Co., 498 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986).
198. See generally Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not At Work?:
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 646–70 (2004) (discussing the few state statutes that provide comprehensive
protection for employees for their off-duty conduct, including their associations).
199. See id. at 669–70 (discussing Connecticut’s statute, which protects employees who
exercise rights guaranteed by the First Amendment but which has been interpreted to protect only
speech related to matters of public concern).
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articulated public goal, state law will often recognize a cause of action.200
If one looks carefully, one can see a similar theme in certain areas of
federal employment discrimination law. At least in an indirect manner,
federal law protects an employee’s interest in intimate association by
prohibiting an employer from taking adverse action based on an
employee’s association with an individual of another race.201 The policy
can be seen more directly in the language of § 12203(b) of the ADA,
which, as discussed, prohibits taking action against an individual who has
aided or encouraged another individual in the exercise or enjoyment of her
rights under the ADA.202 As mentioned, the language of § 12203(b) is
derived from pre-existing labor law.203 The fact that the policy of
protecting full freedom of association that was at the foundation of early
labor law continues in modern individual rights statutes is significant. It
is a reminder that despite the clear distinction between traditional labor
law and more modern individual rights statutes drawn by many
attorneys,204 “labor law” and “employment law” are not necessarily
mutually exclusive terms. The fact that labor law’s stated goal of
protecting employees’ “right of association” lives on in the ADA, a statute
with direct application to the workplace, is yet another reminder that labor
law and anti-discrimination statutes are, in the words of one court, “‘part
of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace
nationwide.’”205
As part of this wider statutory scheme, the anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII should, to the extent possible, be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the general approach of other areas of the law governing
the workplace. To be sure, attorneys and courts have generally failed to
develop a unified vision of the law of workplace.206 All too often, there is
no attempt to reconcile “labor law” with “employment law,” and the result
200. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.15(2) (2006) (making it illegal to retaliate against a person
because that person “associated with a person or group of persons who are disabled or who are of
different race, color, creed, religion, sexual orientation, or national origin”); Cole v. Seafare Enters.
Ltd., 1996 WL 60970, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1996) (concluding that discrimination against
an individual based on her association with a person of another race qualifies as unlawful
discrimination).
201. See supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
203. See Weber, supra note 93, at 257. (stating that § 12203(b)’s language originated in the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and continued through the NLRA and Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152(3)–(4) (2000)).
204. See Corbett, supra note 58, at 263–64 (noting the dichotomy between labor and
employment law).
205. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 570 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995)).
206. Corbett, supra note 58, at 264; see Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American
Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1592 (2002).
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is a sometimes disjointed approach to the problems of the modern
workplace.207 Admittedly, there will be times when, for example, due to
labor law’s focus on collective bargaining over the terms and conditions
of employment,208 the two areas will be incapable of reconcilation.
Therefore, courts must be cautious about importing wholesale concepts
from one area that do not necessarily fit neatly within the other area.209
But, for reasons explained in greater detail below, there is nothing
inherently inconsistent about interpreting individual rights statutes so that
they can, to the extent possible, encourage an increased level of
association and sense of attachment among coworkers, just as labor law
has traditionally sought to do.
One of the more offensive effects of the majority interpretations of
§ 704(a) is that they permit an employer to use an employee’s intimate
association with another as a weapon to silence opposition. There is at
least some disagreement as to whether public employees have association
claims based upon an employer’s interference with their intimate
associations, rather than those associations related to First Amendment
guarantees.210 Regardless, it hardly seems a stretch to conclude that
permitting employers to use their employees’ intimate associations against
them in response to a complaint of discrimination conflicts with the notion
of encouraging full freedom of association. Indeed, it is difficult to think
of a more effective device for suppressing dissent and complaints of
unlawful employer behavior than to take action against an employee’s
friends or family.
The majority approaches also tend to discourage coworkers from
assisting or possibly even associating with a workplace troublemaker. An
employer who takes action against a third party based on the actions of a
workplace troublemaker is essentially sending a message to the rest of the
workforce that “disloyalty” will not be tolerated.211 While the employer’s
actions could be classified as retaliation, they may just as easily be
described as intimidation. Coworkers can hardly be blamed if they
recognize the employer’s signals and choose not to assist the troublemaker
in the pursuit of an internal or formal charge of discrimination, despite the
protection Title VII supposedly provides for victims of retaliation. In
207. See Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting
the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 603 (2005) (noting that the “distinct
but overlapping systems” contained in the NLRA and individual rights statutes “often collide”).
208. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
209. See Rebecca Hanner White, Modern Discrimination Theory and the National Labor
Relations Act, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 99, 156 (1997) (stating that courts that have borrowed from
Title VII when interpreting § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA are “correct to think about and to examine labor
law more globally,” but are incorrect in their approach in this instance).
210. See supra Part II.A.
211. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
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addition, a coworker might very well decide not to associate with the
troublemaker altogether, thereby removing himself as a potential target for
the employer’s actions.
Finally, the majority approaches tend to discourage potential
troublemakers from complaining about unlawful discrimination in an
attempt to assist the victims of discrimination. Nothing in § 704(a)
requires the person engaging in the protected activity to be the victim of
unlawful conduct.212 Therefore, § 704(a) recognizes the possibility that an
employee may feel a sense of loyalty to coworkers sufficient to compel the
employee to take it upon himself to complain about the mistreatment of
others. The process of working together may tend to heighten these
feelings of inter-connectedness and loyalty. Professor Cynthia L. Estlund
has suggested that the process of working together and being part of the
same “team” tends to heighten feelings of inter-connectedness and
loyalty.213 In other words, “getting the job done together tends to create
common ground and to cultivate mutual affinity.”214
But, just as the associates of a troublemaker may be dissuaded from
assisting the troublemaker for fear of employer retaliation, a potential
troublemaker who, out of a sense of loyalty, otherwise might raise
concerns about mistreatment on behalf of a coworker may be disinclined
to raise these concerns. On a more basic level, the majority approaches
would seem to lead to greater isolation and mistrust, rather than a greater
sense of inter-connectedness. Therefore, to the extent that a sense of
solidarity is a benefit of freedom of association in the workplace, the
majority rules tend to discourage protected activity motivated by a sense
of solidarity and desire to assist the victims of discrimination.
B. The Importance of Freedom of Association in Combating
Workplace Discrimination
To the extent there are questions whether the policy in favor of
employee association that is expressed in constitutional law and federal
labor law does or should apply in the private, non-union context, the
benefits of encouraging, or at least not discouraging such association are
almost self-evident. The willingness of coworkers to come forward and
participate in the process of investigating an employee’s discrimination
claim is crucial to the operation of Title VII.215 Unless individuals feel free

212. See Zatz, supra note 185, at 93 (discussing instances in which plaintiffs were successful
in claiming retaliation based on complaints about mistreatment of coworkers).
213. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (2000).
214. Id. at 11.
215. Brake, supra note 2, at 20.

2007]

RETALIATIO N AG AIN ST TH IRD PARTIES AN D TH E RIG H T O F ASSO C IATIO N IN TH E W O RK PLAC E

37

to oppose unlawful discrimination and participate in attempts to address
it without fear of retaliation, the goals of anti-discrimination law cannot be
fulfilled.216 And even more broadly, the willingness on the part of
coworkers to speak out against workplace harassment before it rises to the
level of a hostile work environment may play an important role in
combating discrimination.
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision clearly contemplates that
coworkers and other third parties will play a role in weeding out
discrimination. Section 704(a) protects not only the troublemaker who
complains about discrimination, but anyone who opposes an unlawful
practice or who participates in a proceeding related to a complaint.217
Assuming coworkers are less likely to provide assistance to an employee
who is contemplating filing an internal complaint where the fear of
retaliation exists, the potential troublemaker may potentially be deprived
of the information necessary to establish a good faith, objectively
reasonable belief that the conduct in question is actually unlawful.
Likewise, once an investigation has begun, coworkers may be less likely
to assist the troublemaker or testify against the employer if retaliation is
a realistic threat. As a result, the majority rules tend to impede the
operation of Title VII’s remedial mechanism by preventing full and
complete investigation into the underlying facts of a discrimination claim.
The tendency of the majority approaches to discourage participation in
an internal investigation is particularly distressing in light of the Supreme
Court’s explicit statements as to the desirability of having employers
establish internal complaint procedures. In Ellerth, the Court stated that
“Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies
and effective grievance mechanisms.”218 The establishment of such
policies and mechanisms should be encouraged because the availability of
such measures “could encourage employees to report harassing conduct
before it becomes severe or pervasive,” thereby furthering Title VII’s
deterrent purpose.219 Instead, by potentially exposing complaining
employees to employer retaliation by offering them the sometimes paperthin protection of the opposition clause,220 the federal courts have made it
more likely that isolated acts of discrimination will go unreported, only to
lead to more serious discriminatory acts in the future. Alternatively, the
federal courts encourage employees to bypass any internal alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms an employer may have in place and
proceed directly to filing a charge with the EEOC to obtain the absolute

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000).
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
Id.
See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
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protection of the participation clause.221 Consequently, the majority
approach tends to encourage litigation rather than conciliation in many
cases.222
The majority rules also adversely impact the fight against workplace
discrimination in more subtle ways. To the extent the majority approaches
lead to greater isolation among employees in the workplace, they make
some workers more vulnerable to discrimination and the threat of
retaliation. The threat of retaliation tends to be most effective against
individuals who are somehow “different” or are otherwise already isolated
in the workplace.223 These are precisely the individuals who need the moral
support and other forms of assistance coworkers can provide when
deciding to pursue a claim. Yet, because the majority rules turn would-be
allies into potential targets, they have the potential to discourage
coworkers from assisting those who are most vulnerable to discrimination
and retaliation.
Finally, the majority rules tend to inhibit development of a culture of
opposition to discrimination. Because employment discrimination is often
a matter of shared concern, workplace solidarity may be an effective
device in combating such discrimination.224 Employees frequently take
their cues with respect to the treatment of others from superiors and
coworkers.225 For a culture of discrimination to flourish, there usually must
be acquiescence among management. But discrimination is even more
likely to flourish where rank-and-file employees remain silent in the face
of the mistreatment and marginalization of coworkers.226 Where a sense of
solidarity is permitted to flourish, employees are more likely to oppose
discriminatory treatment of coworkers before it becomes severe or
pervasive.227 Where, however, legal rules exist that permit employers to
retaliate against the friends and relatives of workplace troublemakers and,
in some cases, the troublemakers themselves, increased isolation, instead
of solidarity, is the more likely result.

221. See supra note 143.
222. Cf. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (“[I]t would effect Congress’ intention to promote
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context . . . .”).
223. Brake, supra note 2, at 40.
224. Zatz, supra note 185, at 70.
225. See generally id. at 71–73 (discussing group dynamics and their effects on attitudes
toward discrimination in the workplace); see also Brake, supra note 2, at 41 (“Like discrimination,
retaliation is a product of an organization’s existing climate and structures.”).
226. See Zatz, supra note 185, at 77 (discussing rank and file opposition to discrimination as
an effective complement to “top-down approaches,” such as sensitivity training).
227. Id.
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V. PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION WHILE PROTECTING THIRD
PARTIES FROM RETALIATION
To varying degrees, the courts’ approach to retaliation claims involving
third parties conflicts with the remedial purposes of Title VII. The best
course of action would involve legislative amendment of § 704(a). To
address instances of pure third-party retaliation, Congress could add to
Title VII language similar to that of § 12203(b) of the ADA.228 To address
the problem of reduced coverage for individuals who participate in an
employer’s internal investigation process, Congress could clarify that the
participation clause protects those who participate or assist in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the statute, including any
internal process an employer uses to address workplace discrimination.
Assuming, however, such congressional action is unlikely, a resort to
the courts is inevitable. Given the fact that it remains the express policy of
the United States that workers should enjoy full freedom of association,229
one is tempted to simply point out this fact and state that the interpretation
of any law related to the workplace should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with that policy. However, there are a number of text-based and
policy-based arguments in favor of the current majority approaches. In this
age of textualism, these obstacles in some cases may be formidable.
Nonetheless, in the following Part, I advance several arguments in favor
of a broader reading of the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII in the
context of employer retaliation directed at a third party. In addition, in the
event that courts refuse to depart from the majority approaches to the
various problems described in this Article, this Part offers several other
ways in which courts may conscientiously interpret the anti-retaliation
provisions in a manner that furthers the goal of full freedom of association.
A. Direct Challenges to the Majority Approaches
1. The Suggested Policy Reasons Behind the Majority
Approaches are Unconvincing
a. Pure Third-Party Retaliation Claims
As mentioned, courts have offered several possible explanations for
why Congress might have chosen not to permit claims of pure third-party
retaliation under Title VII.230 When one considers Title VII’s third-party

228. See supra Part II.C.
229. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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retaliation issue within the broader contexts of the right of association in
the workplace and retaliation claims in the workplace, the flimsiness of the
courts’ reasoning in this respect becomes more readily apparent.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Fogleman v. Mercy
Hospital, Inc.231 best illustrates this flimsiness. In Fogleman, the court
concluded that the plain language of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act’s (ADEA) anti-retaliation provision (which is virtually
identical to § 704(a) of Title VII)232 foreclosed the possibility of a
retaliation claim premised solely upon a plaintiff’s association with a
coworker who was engaged in protected activities.233 The court
acknowledged that this reading of the statute was in conflict with the
purpose of the ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision.234 Nonetheless, the court
offered several “plausible” (if, by the court’s own admission, not
particularly convincing) policy reasons why Congress might have
intentionally chosen not to permit such claims.235
The court first suggested that Congress might reasonably have believed
that instances of pure third-party retaliation would be rare given the
likelihood that “‘the relatives and friends who are at risk for retaliation
will have participated in some manner in a co-worker’s charge of
discrimination.’”236 Therefore, most individuals who are at risk of
retaliation will already be protected under the literal language of the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADEA. However, a quick
reading of the case law demonstrates that the number of instances in which
coworkers become the victims of pure third-party retaliation is greater than
the Fogleman court supposes.237 Employer retaliation in general is hardly
uncommon, with retaliation complaints having doubled in the last decade
and now comprising 25% of EEOC charges.238 Furthermore, the number
of instances in which plaintiffs allege instances of pure third-party
retaliation in the public employment,239 union,240 and private, non-union241

231. 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002).
232. See supra note 116.
233. Id. at 569–70.
234. Id. at 569.
235. Id. at 569–70.
236. Id. at 569 (quoting Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996)).
237. See NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987) (“To retaliate
against a man by hurting a member of his family is an ancient method of revenge, and is not
unknown in the field of labor relations.”).
238. Barnard & Rapp, supra note 12, at 658.
239. See cases cited supra notes 31–32.
240. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d at 1088 (“To retaliate against a man by hurting a member
of his family is an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown in the field of labor relations.”);
see id. (listing examples from labor law).
241. See cases cited supra note 72.
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contexts strongly undercuts any notion that retaliation against friends and
relatives who have not participated in a charge of discrimination is a rare
occurrence.
In addition, the Third Circuit suggested that Congress may have been
concerned that by permitting claims of pure third-party retaliation, it
would be opening the door to frivolous claims and interfering with an
employer’s prerogative to fire at-will employees.242 As a result, the
employer might be subjected to virtually unlimited liability in large
workplaces.243 As a preliminary matter, any concerns over an increase in
the number of frivolous claims are greatly reduced by the requirement that
an individual claiming retaliation must establish the existence of a causal
link between the employer’s action and the protected conduct.244 Thus, it
is unlikely that a claim of retaliation by a casual acquaintance of a
coworker who has filed an EEOC charge would withstand an employer’s
summary judgment motion.
But even assuming as the court suggested, that Congress was
concerned about limiting employer discretion and expanding the potential
class of plaintiffs, there remains another question: Why was Congress not
equally concerned about this possibility in the ADA context? In Fogleman,
the court concluded that § 12203(b) of the ADA prohibits an employer
from taking action against a coworker because another employee has filed
a charge of discrimination.245 Permitting the friends and relatives of the
victims of disability discrimination to bring retaliation claims would seem
to present exactly the same problems of limiting employer discretion and
increasing claims that the court postulated may have motivated Congress
to limit the class of plaintiffs in the Title VII and ADEA contexts. Why
would Congress consciously open the door to such problems in one
context but not the other?

242. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp. Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 570 (3d Cir. 2002).
243. See EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 326 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (“The
number of lawsuits which could spawn from this rule could be enormous in a company of any
size.”).
244. It is for this reason that the concern expressed by some courts over the difficulty of
determining which third parties should be permitted to bring third-party retaliation claims hold little
weight. For instance, one court suggested that “expanding the breadth of the retaliation provisions
to include spouses begs the question of who else is protected. Would other relatives, close friends,
life-partners or long-time co-workers be protected?” Sukenic v. Maricopa County, No. Civ. 0202438, 2004 WL 3522690, at *12 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7, 2004). The clear answer to each of these
questions is yes, assuming each of these individuals can allege the elements of a prima facie case
of retaliation. While retaliation directed at a longtime coworker is unlikely to be as painful to a
complaining employee as is retaliation directed at a spouse, it may nonetheless still have the desired
deterrent effect.
245. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570.
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In some instances, it is easy to see why Congress might have chosen to
treat disability discrimination claims differently. For example, Congress
might reasonably have assumed that some individuals with disabilities
might need assistance in asserting their rights246; hence § 12203(b)’s
protection for those who have “aided or encouraged” an individual in the
exercise of his statutory rights.247 Likewise, it would have been entirely
reasonable for Congress to believe that an associate of an individual with
a disability might be at risk based on an employer’s fears or
misperceptions regarding certain disabilities; hence § 12112(b)(4)’s
protection from associational discrimination.248 However, once an
individual has asserted a statutory right under the ADA—by requesting a
reasonable accommodation, filing a charge of discrimination, or some
other action—it is difficult to see how the associates of such individuals
are any more vulnerable to instances of pure third-party retaliation than are
the associates of Title VII and ADEA plaintiffs. Discrimination against
individuals with disabilities may be different than other forms of
discrimination, but it is difficult to see any meaningful difference that
would justify the different treatment in this context.
With the two posited explanations (the rare nature of instances of pure
third-party retaliation and the potential increase in the number of frivolous
claims) debunked, it is difficult to think of any reason why Congress
would have chosen to prohibit pure third-party retaliation in one instance,
but not another. In short, it strains common sense to suggest that Congress
had some reason for affording more protection for the associates of
disability discrimination victims than the associates of race or age
discrimination. Accordingly, there are strong arguments that clinging to
the literal language of the anti-retaliation provisions in Title VII and the
ADEA in the face of conflicting precedent in the analogous context of the
ADA leads to absurd results.
b. Coverage Under the Participation Clause After Resort to an
Employer’s Internal Complaint Mechanism
The policy-based justifications offered by courts for the exclusion of
internal complaints from the coverage of the participation clause are
likewise few in number249 and only slightly more persuasive in nature.
Courts sometimes attempt to downplay the dilemma employees face in
deciding whether to report perceived instances of discrimination to their

246.
247.
248.
249.

For example, in the case of an individual with a psychiatric or other mental impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2000).
See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
Marshall, supra note 137, at 592.
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employers.250 According to these courts, truthful and reasonable employees
face no dilemma at all in deciding whether to file an internal complaint.251
As long as the employee is honest in his allegations and could reasonably
believe that the alleged discriminatory conduct is actually unlawful, the
employee will be covered under the opposition clause.252 Given the
exacting standard of reasonableness employed by some courts, however,
the reality is often much different.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested one possible
reason why Congress might have chosen to exclude participation in an
internal investigation from the coverage of the participation clause:
Congress could have believed that including such
investigations under the participation clause might have a
chilling effect on an employer’s willingness to conduct
internal investigations, and that the risk that employers would
take adverse employment action against employees who
cooperate in internal investigations that the employers
themselves initiate was minimal.253
However, given the widespread fear of retaliation among employees and
the large number of retaliation complaints,254 it would take an almost
willful act of blindness on the part of Congress to conclude that the risk of
retaliation is minimal. Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court’s creation
of the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense, which provides employers
with strong incentives to establish internal mechanisms for dealing with
harassment complaints,255 the Eleventh Circuit’s “chilling effect”
hypothesis seems plainly wrong. In addition to limiting vicarious liability,
an employer that uses an effective internal remedial mechanism may be
able to prevent workplace harassment from becoming so severe or
pervasive that it becomes actionable in the first place.256 The creation of
such a process also drastically reduces the potential for a punitive damages
award, and potentially limits attorney’s costs as well.257 In short, most
rational employers would view the benefits of conducting internal
investigations as far outweighing the costs.

250. See, e.g., Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 447 F.3d 324, 333 (4th Cir.), vacated, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 16794 (4th Cir. July 5, 2006).
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 157 F.3d 824, 830 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated, 172 F.3d
795 (11th Cir.), and superseded by 176 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1999).
254. See Barnard & Rapp, supra note 12, at 669.
255. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
256. Marshall, supra note 137, at 594.
257. Id.
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Deprived of its “chilling effect” theory, the Eleventh Circuit has
subsequently advanced the assertion that it did not believe “Congress
intended to protect absolutely every . . . harassment complaint made to an
employer—no matter how informal or knowingly false—as a protected
activity under the participation clause.”258 The court is almost certainly
correct that Congress did not intend that every informal gripe be treated as
conduct absolutely protected under the expansive participation clause. But
no one is seriously suggesting that they should be.
When, however, an employer has established an internal process
designed to address workplace discrimination that purports to satisfy the
first prong of the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense, there is no
particularly strong reason why Congress would have objected to
classifying participation in the machinery of such a process as protected
participation conduct. Admittedly, Congress may have had reservations
about overburdening private employers with frivolous or false complaints
of discrimination. However, the problem with internal complaint
procedures has long been one of under-reporting, not over-reporting.259
Moreover, in the case of truly frivolous complaints (i.e., those that involve
conduct that no reasonable person could believe to be unlawful), the
employer should recognize the complaint as such and resolve the matter
quickly. Finally, the argument against burdening private employers loses
much of its teeth when one considers that under the majority approach,
participation in an employer’s internal investigation is absolutely protected
under the participation clause if the employee has first filed a formal
charge of discrimination with the EEOC.260 By first paying a visit to the
EEOC before complaining internally, an employee can immunize herself
from employer retaliation even if her allegations are false or frivolous.
Thus, the majority rule simply trips up the employee who foolishly
complains internally before visiting the EEOC, but immunizes the wily
employee who sees the EEOC first. Ultimately, because an employee must
complain internally at some point if she wishes to hold the employer
liable,261 the majority approach does little to discourage false or frivolous
claims. In short, while Congress could have rationally decided that the
costs of burdening employers with the investigation of false or frivolous
claims outweighed the benefits of including participation in an internal
complaint process within the protection of the participation clause, it
would have been remarkably short-sighted on Congress’s part given the
numerous benefits associated with such internal processes.

258. EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000).
259. Chamallas, supra note 137, at 374.
260. See supra note __[DLH: this is the footnote added between original 19 and 20] and
accompanying text.
261. See Larkin, supra note 145, at 1210.
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2. Text-Based Challenges to the Majority Approaches
Ultimately, the most difficult arguments to overcome in calling for a
rejection of the majority approaches to the issues discussed in this Article
are primarily textual in nature. To varying degrees, the most natural
reading of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision supports the conclusion
that claims of pure third-party retaliation are not available and that
participation in an employer’s internal investigative process is not
protected participation conduct. However, courts have not hesitated in
other contexts to interpret anti-retaliation provisions in a more liberal
manner to effectuate the purposes of such provisions. In light of the fact
that the majority approaches have so little to recommend on their behalf
in terms of the purposes of anti-discrimination law, courts should be more
willing to follow the established approach of liberal construction of antiretaliation provisions.
a. The Courts’ History of Liberal (and Sometimes Non-Literal)
Construction of Anti-Retaliation Provisions
Congress’s handiwork in the retaliation area has hardly been a model
of draftsmanship. For example, despite the proscription against sex
discrimination contained in Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972,262 Title IX contains no explicit provision providing protection from
retaliation for those who oppose unlawful discrimination under the statute.
This glaring hole in the statute recently forced the Supreme Court in
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education263 to consider whether to
imply a retaliation claim as implicit in the statute’s prohibition against
discrimination.264 Ultimately, the Court held that retaliation based upon a
complaint of sex discrimination is prohibited under Title IX, concluding
that “[r]etaliation against a person because that person has complained of
sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination”
prohibited by Title IX.265
Similar shortcomings exist with respect to § 704(a) of Title VII. With
the opposition clause, Congress made it unlawful for employers to retaliate
against their employees for opposing unlawful discrimination but failed to
place any limits on just how far employees can go in opposing
discrimination.266 Is a peaceful sit-in permissible? Blocking access to the
employer’s premises as a means of protest? Writing a letter critical of the

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
544 U.S. 167 (2005).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 173.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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employer’s practices to the employer’s customers?267 This failure to define
the boundaries of protected opposition conduct has required courts to
devise fact-intensive and unpredictable tests to help address such issues.268
It is well-established that courts should construe the language of Title
VII in a broad manner, consistent with the Act’s remedial purpose.269 In
some instances, the courts have construed § 704(a) in a manner clearly at
odds with the literal language so as to effectuate the purpose of the
statutes. With regard to the opposition clause, for example, the courts have
almost unanimously concluded that the practice an individual opposes
does not have to actually be unlawful in order for the opposition to be
protected.270 This, despite the fact that the opposition clause literally makes
it unlawful only for an employer to retaliate against an individual who has
“opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter.”271 A literal reading, the courts have explained, “would not
only chill the legitimate assertion of employee rights under Title VII but
would tend to force employees to file formal charges rather than seek
conciliation or informal adjustment of grievances.”272 In other instances,
Congress’s poor draftsmanship has caused courts to construe the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADEA in an expansive fashion
so as to further the purposes of the statutes. Congress’s failure to define the
term “employee” led the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.273 to
hold that the anti-retaliation provisions prohibit employers from retaliating
against both current employees and former employees.274 A contrary
reading, the Court explained, would impede access to statutory remedial
mechanisms.275
In a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Judge Richard Posner
suggested two possible scenarios

267. Cf. EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 1983)
(concluding that writing a letter to local school board, a customer of the employer, protesting an
affirmative action award to the employer was a permissible form of protected opposition). The
leading case in this area is Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222
(1st Cir. 1976), involving an employee who engaged in numerous disruptive activities to protest
her employer’s actions.
268. See R. Bales, A New Standard for Title VII Opposition Cases: Fitting the Personnel
Manager Double Standard into a Cognizable Framework, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 95, 112–17 (1994)
(noting the various balancing tests and problems associated with them).
269. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
270. See, e.g., Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1125 (8th Cir. 2006)
(Colloton, J., dissenting); EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005); see
also Marshall, supra note 137, at 561.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
272. See, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978).
273. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
274. Id. at 346.
275. Id.
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in which a literal interpretation of the provision [protecting
those who have made a charge or participated in any manner
in a proceeding] would leave a gaping hole in the protection
of complainants and witnesses. The first situation . . . is
where the employer either does not know who the
complainant is and decides therefore to retaliate against a
group of workers that he knows includes the complainant, or
makes a mistake and retaliates against the wrong person. The
second situation . . . is where the employer retaliates against
an employee for having failed to prevent the filing of a
complaint.276
The only possible explanation for Congress’s failure to address such cases,
the court stated, was “pure oversight.”277 The case in question actually
involved the second situation, thus leading the court to liberally construe
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to prohibit employers from retaliating
against not only those who, in accordance with the statutory language,
have “made a charge,” but those who are “suspected of having made a
charge” and those who have “allowed a charge to be made.”278
b. Pure Third-Party Discrimination Claims
Given the fact that courts have already been forced on a number of
occasions to construe the language of other anti-retaliation provisions in
a manner not necessarily obvious from the statutory text so as to further
their purpose,279 reading a right to bring a third-party association claim into
the statute would hardly represent a dramatic departure from the courts’
current approach to such statutes. Without a plausible justification to
support the majority approach and with a long history of liberal
construction in the anti-retaliation field supporting a contrary approach, a
federal court could in good conscience reject the majority approach and
recognize a claim of pure third-party retaliation. The most obvious
approach would be to recognize such claims based on the conclusion that
a literal reading of the statute produces results that are so “absurd or
glaringly unjust” (particularly when considered against the backdrop of
labor and employment law more generally) that such a reading should be
rejected.280 Because it is difficult to fathom why Congress would have
chosen the results that the majority approaches dictate, a court could, in

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 262–65 and accompanying text (construing the Title IX provision).
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 (1932).
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keeping with standard methods of statutory construction, conclude that the
right of an associate to be free from discrimination derives from the
troublemaker’s right to be free from discrimination for having engaged in
protected activity. 281
c. The Participation Clause and Participation in an Employer’s
Internal Investigation Process
The statutory construction argument in favor of classifying
participation in an employer’s internal process for resolving discrimination
complaints is actually somewhat easier to make. While § 704(a) protects
those who have participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
“under” the statute, § 704(a) fails to define the terms “investigation,
proceeding, or hearing.”282 Given Congress’s incorporation of federal
judicial decisions into the machinery of employment discrimination law
in other respects, one could argue that the relevant phrase is broad enough
to include investigations, proceedings, or hearings that are part of federal
decisional law.
Ultimately, decisional law interpreting statutory law becomes part of
that statutory law.283 Sometimes, a legislature will explicitly react to and
incorporate decisional law into a statutory framework.284 As part of the
Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991, for example, Congress reacted to
a string of Supreme Court rulings and explicitly declared its intent to “to
codify the concepts . . . enunciated by the Supreme Court in” previous
decisions.285 In other instances, decisional law is implicitly incorporated
into a statutory framework and future controversies are decided “under”
that framework. To be sure, the statutory language of Title VII authorizes
investigations, proceedings, and hearings and provides some details as to
how that machinery is to operate.286 However, the Supreme Court has also
had some say as to the operation of that machinery, having ruled on a
number of procedural matters.287 Thus, an EEOC investigation into a
281. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454–55 (1989).
282. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
283. Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 686 (1879).
284. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(d) (West 2007) (“Notwithstanding any
interpretation of law in [Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993)], the Legislature
intends (1) for state law to be independent of the Americans with Disabilities Act. . . .”); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN § 3501 cmt. (West 2007) (“The first sentence of this subsection essentially
codifies the decision in Litmans v. Litmans, 449 Pa. Super. 209, 673 A.2d 382 (1996), as it pertains
to when to measure the increase in value of nonmarital property.”).
285. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3, 42 U.S.C. 1981 note (2000) (Purposes of 1991
Amendments).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; id. § 2000e-8.
287. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002) (considering the
timeframe within which alleged discriminatory acts are actionable); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449
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charge of discrimination or a formal legal proceeding is conducted “under”
the decisional law of Title VII as well as the text of the statute itself.
Accordingly, it hardly seems a great stretch to conclude that an internal
investigation, proceeding, or hearing that would enable an employer to
avoid the imposition of vicarious liability per Ellerth and Faragher could
constitute an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. As a
result of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, the
absence or availability of an effective internal process helps determine the
relative rights and liabilities of parties to an employment discrimination
suit.288 In addition, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have
developed a substantial body of law relating to what constitutes an
effective internal process for purposes of the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative
defense.289 Accordingly, any investigations, proceedings, or hearings
occurring as part of such a process are governed “under” the decisional
law of Title VII.
Moreover, when an employer has in place an effective process for
resolving internal harassment issues, an employee cannot bypass the
process without forfeiting the ability to hold the employer vicariously
liable unless the employee has a good reason for doing so. Regardless
whether the employee first complains internally or files a formal EEOC
charge, unless the employee has a valid excuse for not doing so, she must
complain internally if she wishes to recover from her employer.290 As a
result of the Supreme Court’s creation of the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative
defense, the filing of an internal discrimination complaint is an act, in the
words of one court, that is “an intimately related and integral step in the
process of making a formal charge”291 for any employee in a workplace
that has an internal process for addressing workplace discrimination.
In short, there is at least a plausible argument that the statutory
language in question is ambiguous. Once one concludes that the statutory
language could be interpreted to include participation in an internal
complaint, it becomes clear for the reasons discussed previously that the
purpose of the participation clause can be furthered only by adopting such
a construction. It is difficult to see a logical basis for affording an
employee protection under the participation clause when she proceeds
directly to the EEOC and files a formal discrimination charge and then
returns to file an internal complaint with the employer, but not when the
order is reversed. Indeed, as a matter of policy, we want to encourage the
employee to use whatever internal measures an employer may have in

U.S. 250, 256 (1980) (determining when the limitations period commences).
288. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Croushorn v. Bd. of Trs., 518 F. Supp. 9 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
290. Id. at 23.
291. Id.
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place before filing a formal charge. The use of such procedures may
obviate the need for a visit to the EEOC and the lawyer’s office. For these
reasons, a conclusion that participation in an employer’s internal antiharassment process is conduct falling under the participation clause is
warranted as a matter of statutory interpretation.
B. Alternative Interpretive Approaches to Narrow the Existing
Gap in Coverage
There may be instances in which, due to existing precedent or other
factors, courts are reluctant to depart from the majority approaches in the
types of cases discussed in this Article. Alternatively, there may be
instances in which workplace troublemakers and their friends and family
fall through the cracks even when a court interprets Title VII in a more
generous manner. Accordingly, courts can narrow some of the gaps in
statutory coverage through a more liberal interpretation of the antiretaliation provisions in other respects.
1. Reinstating the Troublemaker’s Friend as a Remedy for the
Troublemaker
One possibility would be for courts to provide a workplace
troublemaker with the remedy of reinstating the troublemaker’s friend in
the event the friend is discharged as a result of the troublemaker’s
protected activity. One potential deterrent to an employer taking action
against a friend or relative of a workplace troublemaker is that such action
could lead to a viable retaliation claim by the troublemaker. For years, a
circuit split existed regarding the question of what employer action
constituted actionable retaliation under Title VII.292 Some courts asserted
that the retaliation must be related to the plaintiff’s employment to
constitute actionable retaliation. Thus, the retaliation had to “‘resul[t] in
an adverse effect on the ‘terms, conditions, or benefits’ of
employment,’”293 or, even more restrictively, result in an “‘ultimate
employment decisio[n],’” such as hiring or firing.294 Other courts did not
restrict retaliation claims to situations in which the retaliatory action was
related to the plaintiff’s employment or workplace. Thus, retaliation would
be actionable if the employer’s action “would have been material to a
reasonable employee” or would be “reasonably likely to deter the charging

292. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2006).
293. Id. (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)) (summarizing
the position of the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals).
294. Id. at 2410–11 (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.
1997)) (summarizing the position of the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals).
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party or others from engaging in protected activity.”295
The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway Co. v. White296 resolved the issue. The Court concluded that
actionable retaliation is not limited to employment-related actions or
actions that otherwise affect the terms, conditions, or status of
employment.297 Instead, the Court concluded that “a plaintiff must show
that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’”298 The Court observed that limiting retaliation claims to
situations resulting in employment-related actions “would not deter the
many forms that effective retaliation can take,” including actions resulting
in “harm outside the workplace.”299
The standard articulated by the Court is almost certainly broad enough
to include a situation in which an employer discharged or otherwise took
action against a friend or loved one of a party who had opposed
discrimination in the workplace or who was pursuing a charge of
discrimination. The knowledge that an employer would resort to taking
action against a friend or loved one would undoubtedly dissuade many
reasonable employees from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination. In this respect, those courts in the majority on the question
whether to permit a claim of pure third-party retaliation might find support
for their positions in the Court’s decision; the specter of a retaliation claim
by the troublemaker stemming from employment retaliation directed at a
friend or relative could serve as a deterrent to such retaliation.
Ultimately, however, there is reason to question how effective of a
deterrent the Court’s decision in Burlington Northern is likely to be in
these instances. Except perhaps in those limited instances in which the
troublemaker is denied the financial support that a friend or loved one
provides as a result of the employer’s retaliation, in most instances the
troublemaker’s compensatory damages will consist exclusively of
emotional distress damages. The distress an individual suffers from
knowing that she is the cause of a loved one’s discharge from employment
may well be substantial; however, in those instances in which the
retaliation amounts to something less than outright discharge (demotion,

295. Id. (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); Ray
v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2000)) (summarizing the positions of the Seventh,
D.C., and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals).
296. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
297. Id. at 2414–15.
298. Id. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal
citations omitted)).
299. Id. at 2412.
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reassignment with less desirable duties, etc.), the distress suffered by the
troublemaker is less likely to be severe. In short, while the Court’s
interpretation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision may help preserve
employees’ access to the statute’s remedial mechanisms, its value in
limiting employer action directed specifically at third parties may prove
to be limited.
The more appropriate remedy in such cases would be to order the
employer to reinstate or, where appropriate, award backpay to the
troublemaker’s friend. Section 706(g) of Title VII “vest[s] broad equitable
discretion in the federal courts” to remedy the effects of discrimination.300
A court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay . . . or any other relief as the court deems
appropriate.”301 Reinstatement is actually “the preferred equitable remedy”
under Title VII.302 Given the chilling effect on other employees that
retaliation may cause, reinstatement is a particularly appropriate remedy
in the case of retaliation.303
Employer retaliation is particularly harmful to the aims of Title VII
because of the effect it may have on the willingness of third parties to
oppose unlawful conduct or otherwise participate in an investigation into
unlawful discrimination. Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the
adverse effects to third parties stemming from employer retaliation when
fashioning a response. For example, in cases in which retaliation plaintiffs
have sought an injunction to prevent an employer from firing them based
on their protected conduct, at least one court has been willing to hold that
the chilling effect on other employees resulting from permitting the
employer to fire the troublemaker might constitute an “irreparable injury”
necessary to support an injunction.304
When it is established that an employer took action against the friend
or relative of a troublemaker because the troublemaker engaged in
protected activity, the only meaningful remedy in some cases will involve
undoing the effects of the employer’s adverse action. If this cannot be
accomplished by granting the troublemaker’s friend a right to bring his
own retaliation claim, the purposes of the statute may still be effectuated
by granting equitable relief to the troublemaker in the form of reinstating,
compensating, or otherwise undoing the employer’s action with respect to

300. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
302. Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of City of Hazel Park, 364 F.3d 753, 761 (6th Cir. 2004).
303. 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 679
(Paul W. Crane, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 1996); supra note 81 and accompanying text.
304. Bonds v. Heyman, 950 F. Supp. 1202, 1214–15 (D.D.C. 1997); Segar v. Civiletti, 516
F. Supp. 314, 320 (D.D.C. 1981).
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the troublemaker’s friend. Such an approach is consistent with the Court’s
reasoning in Burlington Northern and with the purposes of anti-retaliation
provisions more generally.
Moreover, there is actually precedent for ordering this type of equitable
relief in retaliation cases. In the labor cases discussed previously in which
an employer discharged a supervisor–spouse in response to an
employee–spouse’s protected union activities, the federal courts upheld the
NLRB’s order to reinstate the supervisor.305 The courts have been willing
to reach this result, despite the fact that supervisors are technically not
entitled to protection under the NLRA, so that other employees are not
deterred from exercising their rights for fear that their employer might
retaliate by going after a loved one.306 Courts have likewise affirmed the
NLRB’s orders to reinstate a supervisor when the supervisor was
disciplined for opposing unlawful employer conduct, refusing to
participate in such conduct, or participating in an NLRB proceeding
involving a charge of such conduct.307 In addition, the remedy in some of
these cases has not always been limited to reinstatement. In Kenrich
Petrochemicals Inc. v. NLRB,308 for example, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the NLRB’s order to reinstate the supervisor with
backpay.309 Other courts have done the same in similar situations.310
Because the dangers inherent in permitting employers to engage in these
types of actions are identical in both situations, the remedy of
reinstatement with backpay of the troublemaker’s friend should be
available in Title VII cases as well.
2. Recognizing the “Perception Theory” of Retaliation
The “perception theory” of retaliation employed by several courts may
also prove highly important in combating retaliation and discrimination.
Under this approach, what is significant is not whether an employee
actually engaged in protected activity but whether the employer, correctly
305. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
306. NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 1987).
307. See Delling v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 1397, 1397 (10th Cir. 1989) (reinstating a supervisor who
refused to falsify termination slips to establish a pretexual reason for an unlawful discharge);
Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 702 F.2d 1, 1–2 (1st Cir. 1983) (reinstating a supervisor who failed
to identify coworkers at a union meeting); Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 204,
206 (8th Cir. 1977) (reinstating a supervisor who refused to continue surveillance of union
activities); NLRB v. Electro Motive Mfg. Co., 389 F.2d 61, 62 (4th Cir. 1968) (reinstating
supervisor who provided a statement to the NLRB regarding threats to employees).
308. 907 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc).
309. Id. at 402.
310. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 551 F.2d at 206 (enforcing the NLRB’s order that a
supervisor be reinstated and be made whole “for any loss of earnings”); Electro Motive Mfg. Co.,
389 F.2d at 62 (enforcing the NLRB’s order to reinstate a supervisor with backpay).
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or incorrectly, believed the employee did so and took action because of
that belief.311 Application of this perception theory of retaliation, which
has also been used in the labor law context,312 may help to limit the
number of instances of retaliation directed at third parties.
For example, in Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the ADEA’s antiretaliation provision prevented the court from recognizing a claim of pure
third-party retaliation on behalf of a son who had allegedly been fired in
retaliation for his father’s filing of an age discrimination complaint.313 The
son also claimed, however, that even if he personally had not been
engaged in protected activity that the employer perceived him to have been
so engaged and that an adverse action based on such perception was
unlawful.314 The court read the ADEA as “directly supporting” the son’s
perception theory of retaliation.315 The court’s language is instructive:
“Discriminat[ion]” refers to the practice of making a decision
based on a certain criterion, and therefore focuses on the
decisionmaker’s subjective intent. What follows, the word
“because,” specifies the criterion that the employer is
prohibited from using as a basis for decisionmaking. The
laws, therefore, focus on the employer’s subjective reasons
for taking adverse action against an employee, so it matters
not whether the reasons behind the employer’s discriminatory
animus are actually correct as a factual matter.316
Therefore, the court concluded, if the son could establish that the
employer’s decision to fire him was “because” of its perception that he
was assisting his father, he was entitled to recover under the ADEA’s antidiscrimination provision.317 As Fogleman suggests, recognizing the
perception theory would help to narrow the current gap in coverage for the
troublemaker’s friend.

311. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Bojangles
Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 328 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Grosso v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 03 Civ.
2619NRB, 2005 WL 627644, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2005). But see Salay v. Baylor Univ., 115
S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App. 2003) (refusing to adopt such an approach on the grounds that it would
conflict with the plain language of the statute and would encroach on the employment at-will rule).
312. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 571. The theory also has been applied with respect to the antiretaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1549
(8th Cir. 1994); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987).
313. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570.
314. Id. at 571.
315. Id.
316. Id. The son also was asserting retaliation under the ADA and state law, so the court’s
holding applies with equal force to those statutes as well. Id. at 568.
317. Id. at 572.
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3. Recognizing the “Anticipatory Retaliation” Theory
Another approach that might help narrow the gap in coverage,
particularly in the case of the filing of an internal complaint, is adoption
of the “anticipatory retaliation” theory. As another example of how a
literal reading of § 704(a) can lead to absurd results, § 704(a) is written in
the past tense;318 thus, under a literal reading, an employer could take
preemptive action against an employee who the employer knew was about
to file a charge with the EEOC and not face a retaliation claim.319 Because
such a result would obviously thwart the purposes of the anti-retaliation
provisions, several federal courts have held that such anticipatory
retaliation is actionable.320
By filing an internal complaint of discrimination, an employee has
signaled the possibility, if not the likelihood, that a formal EEOC charge
may be forthcoming if the matter is not resolved to the employee’s
satisfaction.321 As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “Action
taken against an individual in anticipation of that person engaging in
protected opposition to discrimination is no less retaliatory than action
taken after the fact.”322 Either form of retaliation is likely to have a chilling
effect on the willingness of employees to use the statutes’ remedial
mechanisms. Therefore, courts should adopt this theory of anticipatory
retaliation, despite the fact that the literal language of the statutes permits
retaliation claims only after an individual has engaged in protected
conduct.

318. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) (prohibiting an employer from retaliating against an
individual “because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing”) (emphasis added).
319. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993).
320. Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002); Sauers, 1 F.3d at
1128; EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 328 (M.D.N.C. 2003). See generally
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (stating that Title VII should not be interpreted
to “provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII
claims”). But see Attieh v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 03-04-00450-CV, 2005 WL 1412124, at
*7 (Tex.App. June 16, 2005) (mem.) (rejecting this approach in applying provisions of the Texas
labor code).
321. McLemore v. Detroit Receiving Hosp. & Univ. Med. Ctr., 493 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992) (advancing this reasoning in support of a conclusion that participation in an
employer’s internal complaint procedure constitutes protected participation conduct under identical
state statute).
322. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1128.
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4. Relaxing the “Good-Faith, Reasonable Belief” Standard
As the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jordan v. Alternative Resources
Corp. illustrates,323 courts sometimes hold employees to an extremely
demanding standard of reasonableness when assessing whether an
employee had a good-faith, reasonable belief that the conduct being
opposed was unlawful. As discussed, this approach can discourage
participation in internal complaint procedures and chill complaints by
troublemakers on behalf of their coworkers.324 If courts are going to force
participants in an employer’s internal investigation procedure to seek the
more limited protection the opposition clause affords, they should be
willing to take a reasonable view of what the “reasonable” employee might
believe with respect to the complained-of discrimination.
A reasonable Title VII lawyer may understand the legal rules that have
developed regarding single, isolated incidents or employer liability for a
supervisor’s discriminatory conduct as opposed to coworker
discrimination. But these are subtleties that are likely to be lost on all but
the most sophisticated of employees. When the Supreme Court has
provided employers with a strong incentive to adopt internal mechanisms
for dealing with workplace discrimination, and when employers have
created such mechanisms and publicized their existence to employees,
courts should hardly be surprised when employees report conduct that falls
short of the standard a reasonable Title VII plaintiff’s attorney would want
to see before agreeing to accept the matter. Indeed, this is arguably what
the Supreme Court contemplated when it suggested that one of the benefits
of establishing such mechanisms would be that employees could complain
about harassment before it became actionable.325 Therefore, the
“reasonableness” of an employee’s belief should be assessed less with
regard to the existing state of Title VII law and more in keeping with
traditional common–law notions of what the “reasonable person” might
think under the same circumstances.326 Under this standard, the fact that a
supervisor or coworker made only one racist statement, for example,
would not automatically prevent an employee from possessing a goodfaith, reasonable belief regarding the unlawfulness of the behavior.327
Existing Title VII case law would not necessarily always be irrelevant
under this approach. If, for example, the plaintiff’s claim that

323. See supra notes 160–67 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part II.B.2.
325. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
326. Brake, supra note 2, at 102–03.
327. Cf. Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 190, 195–96 (7th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that an employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that a Title VII violation was in
progress when a coworker, on a single occasion, used a racial slur and apologized shortly
thereafter).
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discrimination had occurred would amount to the assertion of a frivolous
claim in reference to existing Title VII case law, a court might be justified
in concluding as a matter of law that the plaintiff lacked a good-faith,
reasonable belief that the complained-of conduct was unlawful.328 But
defining the reasonableness of an individual employee’s belief as to the
unlawful nature of another’s conduct solely or even predominately by
reference to existing Title VII case law is an unrealistic approach that is
ultimately contrary to the aims of Title VII.
5. Broadly Construing the “Assist” Language
A broad reading of the “assist[]” language in § 704(a) may also help
narrow the gap in coverage. As discussed, one reason why courts have
suggested that there is no need to recognize claims of pure third-party
retaliation is because they view the language of the participation clause as
being exceedingly broad to begin with; there is no need to recognize
claims of pure third-party retaliation, the argument goes, because in most
instances friends or family members are likely to “‘have participated in
some manner in a coworker’s charge of discrimination.’”329 If courts are
going to deny claims of pure third-party retaliation based on the
assumption that the language of the participation clause is sufficiently
broad to protect friends or family members in most instances, then the
language should, in fact, be given an expansive interpretation that reflects
that assumption.
The concept of assistance should not be limited to situations in which
an employee provides active assistance in an investigation, such as helping
a coworker draft a statement regarding an alleged incident of
discrimination. “Assistance” can take on many forms. From time to time,
courts equate moral support with assistance,330 most notably in tort law’s
recognition that moral support may be the equivalent of participation or
physical assistance in a tortious act.331 The NLRB has recognized the
important role that a coworker’s moral support may play in the context of
328. Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 2006).
329. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holt v. JTM
Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996)).
330. See Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 237 F.3d 394, 401 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“[N]onparties often provide aid to litigants, whether through financial backing, legal assistance,
amicus briefs, or moral support.”); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/IT, Judgment, para 235 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugo. (1998)), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, 365 (1999) (noting that “the actus reus of aiding
and abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime”).
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979) (“Advice or encouragement to
act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it
has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance.”).
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an employee’s request for the presence of a coworker during an
employer’s investigation that could result in discipline. According to the
NLRB, the requested employee’s mere presence during an investigation
can advance the goal of insuring that a lone employee is not overpowered
by management.332 In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., the Supreme Court
similarly recognized that the presence of a coworker during an
investigation may be beneficial to an employee given the fact that “[a]
single employee confronted by an employer . . . may be too fearful or
inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated.”333
Likewise, the NLRB has recognized the useful role that the moral support
of coworkers may play in addressing workplace inequality in non–union
settings.334
Perhaps the act of remaining friends with a workplace troublemaker
may not amount to protected activity.335 But surely subtle words of
encouragement and assurances of support can qualify as assistance in some
manner. The simple knowledge that one is part of a group and has the
continued support of that group may give aid and comfort to an individual
employee even if the group does not more actively assist the individual
employee in confronting an employer or pursuing a claim.336 The moral
support of friends and relatives almost unquestionably plays an important
role in encouraging an individual to pursue a charge of discrimination.
Those who are perceived as workplace troublemakers often face
institutional pressure based on the organization’s tolerance for
discrimination that can dissuade them from pursuing their discrimination
charges.337 The support of coworkers then plays an important
countervailing role in encouraging a claimant to soldier on. As Professor
Ann C. Hodges has concluded, “The support of coworkers can make the
difference for employees between pursuing claims or giving up.”338
Because such moral support has at least some tendency to further the
investigation, it should be classified as assistance “in any manner in an

332. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1015 (1982).
333. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 262–63 (1975).
334. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015 (“[W]ithout the benefit of a grievancearbitration procedure to check unjust or arbitrary conduct, an employee in an unorganized plant
may experience even greater apprehension than one in an organized plant and need the moral
support of a sympathetic fellow employee.”).
335. See Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not
believe that . . . friendship . . . constitutes protected activity.”).
336. See Morris, supra note 44, at 1706 (noting the “‘aid’ or perceived ‘protection’ that a
group of employees may feel by virtue of their being part of a group, even when the group does not
make overtures to management”).
337. Brake, supra note 2, at 38–39.
338. Hodges, supra note 207, at 614–15 (stating that “a collective system . . . requires
[workers] to interact with one another creating a more communal system”).
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investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII or the ADEA.339
Similarly, the simple act of discussing an instance of perceived
discrimination with a coworker should qualify as protected participation
or assistance, at least after the filing of a charge of discrimination.
Listening to a coworker describe an instance of perceived discrimination
and engaging in conversation with the coworker about that situation may
aid the coworker in better understanding not only her legal rights but the
nuances of the conflict with the employer and the potential impact the
charge of discrimination may have on the employee and others in the
workplace. A conversation may also simply help a charging employee
develop a tighter grasp of the relevant facts.340 In any event, such
conversations tend to aid in the proceeding and should therefore qualify as
protected conduct.341
6. An Illustration
In some instances, a court may need to employ more than one of these
approaches in order to provide protection to the troublemaker’s friend. For
example, consider the case of EEOC v. Bojangles Restaurants, Inc.,342 the
case discussed in Part I. In that case, former employee Eugene Mestas was
threatening to sue the employer while his fiancée, Revonda Mickle, was
on maternity leave.343 Six days after Mestas’s lawyer sent the employer a
demand letter, Mickle called her supervisor and asked to end her maternity
leave early and return to work “in light of Mr. Mesta’s termination and the
couple’s need for income.”344 Instead, Mickle was never permitted to
return to work, allegedly in retaliation for her fiancé’s actions.345 In ruling
on the employer’s 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court concluded, in keeping
with the majority of federal courts, that an associate of an individual
engaging in protected activity under Title VII who was allegedly retaliated
against due to the actions of the other individual does not automatically
have a retaliation claim.346 Nonetheless, the court concluded “by
construing the existing language in a natural, unstrained fashion, albeit
broadly,” that the plaintiff had stated a claim for retaliation under Title
VII.347
339. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) (emphasis added).
340. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
341. Cf. Adelphi Inst., Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1075 (1988) (Member Johansen, dissenting)
(stating that “it can scarcely be doubted” that an employee facing probation was seeking the aid of
a coworker “at least in determining the impact of probation” by initiating a discussion about the
coworker’s past probation).
342. 284 F. Supp. 2d 320 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
343. Id. at 324.
344. Id. at 324–25.
345. Id. at 325.
346. Id. at 325–26.
347. Id. at 327.
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To reach this conclusion, the court first had to contend with the fact
that Mickle had not assisted an individual who had already “made a
charge” of illegal discrimination as seemingly required by the statutory
language of Title VII.348 However, because the court concluded that,
despite the literal language of the statute, Title VII allows for charges of
anticipatory retaliation, the fact that Mestas had not yet filed a charge did
not pose a problem.349 Nor, according to the court, was it necessary that an
employer actually be correct about whether an employee plans to assist
another employee.350 Instead, “an employer’s perception or even
misperception can lead to potential liability.”351
Also, the court concluded that “the word ‘assisted’ means providing
voluntary or involuntary support in any manner to a person the employer
believes to have engaged, or fears will be engaging, in protected
activity.”352 Based on that definition, the court found that Mickle’s desire
to return to work early could amount to assisting Mestas in his claim, or
at least that the employer could have perceived her desire as such.353
“Without the financial support from Mickle,” the court suggested, “Mestas
could well be forced to accept a quick and/or small settlement,” or might
have difficulty retaining counsel.354
Alternatively, given Mickle’s employment at the restaurant, which
“gave her possible direct knowledge of the truth or falsity of Mestas’
allegations,” the employer could reasonably expect Mickle to be
interviewed as part of any investigation.355 And, given the relationship
between Mickle and Mestas, the employer could easily perceive that
Mickle would provide favorable testimony that would aid Mestas’s
claim.356 According to the court, providing favorable testimony can
amount to assisting “in any manner” a coworker.357 Indeed, the court said,
merely serving as a witness could potentially amount to protected
participation under the participation clause.358 Accordingly, the court
concluded that even though Mickle had no retaliation claim simply as a
result of her close relationship to Mestas, Mickle had at least stated a cause
of action for retaliation under Title VII.359

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 329–30.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Employer action taken against third parties in retaliation for complaints
of discrimination is a problem that undermines the effectiveness of the
anti-discrimination mandates of Title VII and the ADEA. Under the
prevailing trend, employees who are the victims of such retaliation have
few remedies.360 Aside from the fundamental unfairness of such a result,
not permitting the victims of pure third-party retaliation and those who
have assisted or otherwise participated in an internal investigation of
discrimination to bring claims of pure third-party retaliation has several
negative consequences. It discourages the willingness of coworkers to
participate in an investigation or proceeding pursuant to the statutes for
fear of incurring the employer’s wrath. It similarly discourages coworkers
from associating with a perceived troublemaker for fear that they may
become associated with the troublemaker in the mind of the employer. The
right of association has often produced meaningful changes in American
society. Protecting the ability of employees to associate with one another
may likewise potentially reduce the number of instances of discrimination
in the workplace.

360. It is possible that in some instances state law might provide a remedy for cases of pure
third-party retaliation. See MO. REV. STAT. § 213.070(4) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against
a person “because of such person’s association with any person” who engages in protected activity);
McLemore v. Detroit Receiving Hosp. & Univ. Med. Ctr., 493 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that the anti-retaliation provision of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, which employs
language identical to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, prohibits retaliation against an employee
who files an internal complaint of discrimination); Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d
505, 509 (N.J. 1995) (concluding that New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, which parallels
§ 12203(b) of the ADA, permits claims of third-party retaliation); Texas Dep’t of Assistive &
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Abraham, 2006 WL 191940, at *6 (Tex. App. Jan. 26, 2006) (concluding
that the participation clause of Texas’s anti-retaliation provision, which protects a person who “files
a complaint,” covers a person who files an internal complaint). See generally Alex B. Long, “If the
Train Should Jump the Track . . . ”: Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment
Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469 (2006) (discussing the potential for state courts to
interpret state statutes in a manner contrary to the interpretation of identical or similarly worded
federal statutes).

